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Abstract 
During the period 1991-1999, stock returns were correlated with the G-Index based on 
twenty-four governance provisions (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) and the E-Index based on 
the six provisions that matter most (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)). This correlation, however, 
did not persist during the subsequent period 2000-2008. We provide evidence that both the identified 
correlation and its subsequent disappearance were due to market participants’ gradually learning to 
appreciate the difference between firms scoring well and poorly on the governance indices. 
Consistent with the learning hypothesis, we find that: 
(i) The disappearance of the governance-return correlation was associated with an increase in 
the attention to governance by a wide range of market participants;  
(ii) Until the beginning of the 2000s, but not subsequently, stock market reactions to earning 
announcements reflected the market’s being more positively surprised by the earning announcements 
of good-governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms;  
(iii) Stock analysts were also more positively surprised by the earning announcements of 
good-governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms until the beginning of the 2000s but 
not afterwards;   
(iv) While the G-Index and E-Index could no longer generate abnormal returns in the 2000s, 
their negative association with Tobin’s Q and operating performance persisted; and 
(v) The existence and subsequent disappearance of the governance-return correlation cannot 
be fully explained by additional common risk factors suggested in the literature for augmenting the 
Fame-French-Carhart four-factor model. 
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In an influential paper, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (hereinafter GIM) identified a 
governance-based trading strategy that would have produced abnormal profits during the period 
1990–1999. This strategy was based on a G-Index that GIM constructed on the basis of 24 
governance provisions that weaken shareholder rights. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
(hereinafter BCF) subsequently showed that these results were  driven by 6 out of the 24 
provisions and constructed an E-Index based on these 6 provisions. The intriguing correlation 
between governance and returns has attracted a great deal of attention ever since it was first 
reported, and the G-Index and E-Index have been extensively used.  
In this paper, we contribute to understanding GIM’s and BCF’s results concerning the 
association between governance and abnormal returns. We show that the G-Index and E-Index 
were  no longer associated with abnormal returns during the period of 2000–2008 (or any 
subperiods within it), and we then investigate what explains both the existence of the 
governance-returns correlation during the 1990s and its subsequent disappearance.  We identify 
several systematic differences between the 1990s and subsequent years and relate them to the 
disappearance of the governance-returns correlation. We provide evidence that is consistent with 
the hypothesis that both the existence and disappearance of the correlation were due to market 
participants’ learning to appreciate the difference between well-governed and poorly governed 
firms.  
GIM and BCF found that governance provisions—or the characteristics of firms’ governance 
and culture that they reflect—are associated with lower industry-adjusted Q.  Subsequent work 
found additional links between the G and E indices and firm performance. For example, Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2007) find that worse G-Index and E-Index scores are correlated with worse 
acquisition decisions (as measured by the stock market returns accompanying acquisition 
announcements), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that worse scores are correlated with 
a less valuable use of cash holdings.  
That the G-Index and E-Index are associated with lower firm value and worse firm 
performance, however, does not imply that these indices should be associated with abnormal 
stock returns, as GIM and BCF found for the period 1990–1999. To the extent that market prices 
already reflect fully the differences between well-governed and poorly governed firms, trading 
on the basis of the governance indices should not be expected to yield abnormal profits.    2 
We conduct in this paper a series of tests for one possible explanation of the abnormal returns 
during the 1990s. According to this “learning” explanation, which was noted by GIM, investors 
in 1990 did not fully appreciate the differences between firms with good and bad governance 
scores. The legal developments that shaped the significance of the G-Index  and E-Index 
provisions took place largely during the 1980s, which was also when many of these provisions 
were adopted. In 1990, investors might not yet have had sufficient experience to be able to 
forecast the expected difference in performance between well-governed and poorly governed 
firms. Under the “learning” hypothesis, the association between governance indices and returns 
during the 1990s was expected to continue only up to the point at which a sufficient number of 
market participants would learn to appreciate fully the differences between well-governed and 
poorly  governed firms. Noting the empirical evidence that lengthy intervals are sometimes 
necessary even for information that is relatively tangible to be incorporated in prices,
1 GIM 
suggested that it was not possible at the time of their article to forecast when such a process of 
price adjustment would be completed. 
We begin by showing that, consistent with learning, the association between the governance 
indices did not persist. Using the exact methods employed by GIM (and subsequently BCF) for 
1990–1999, we find that this association did not exist during the subsequent period of 2000–
2008. Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) note that the GIM strategy did not produce abnormal 
returns during the four-year period 2000–2003, but were naturally cautious about drawing 
inferences from the relatively short period they examined, and did not focus on the change or 
seek to explain it. Our robust findings for a period of similar length to the one studied by GIM 
enable concluding that the documented governance-returns association did not persist after the 
1990s.  
Note that, to the extent that the disappearance of abnormal returns was due to learning, such 
learning did not necessarily have to involve learning about the significance of the provisions in 
the governance indices. While some market participants might have learned to appreciate that 
certain governance provisions are associated with worse expected performance, other market 
                                                 
1 GIM cited in this connection the evidence that earnings surprises (Bernard and Thomas, 1989), dividend 
omissions (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995), and stock repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen, 1995) have long-term drift following the event, and noted that all seem to be relatively simple 
pieces of information compared with governance structures.   3 
participants might have directly identified the differences in future performance between the 
firms that score well and poorly on the governance indices. For our purposes, the learning 
hypothesis involves market participants, in the aggregate, coming to appreciate the difference 
between firms that score well and poorly on the governance indices regardless of whether all or 
some of these participants made use of all the components of the indices themselves.  
To investigate further the learning  hypothesis, we study how the existence of abnormal 
returns to governance strategies was associated with changes in the attention paid to governance 
by market participants. We identify proxies for the attention to governance by the media, 
institutional investors, and academic researchers, as well as construct an aggregate attention 
index. We find that the decrease in the returns to the governance strategies was associated with 
an increase in levels of attention to governance. Furthermore, analyzing potential structural 
breaking points in the pattern of returns, we find that their location corresponds to the period in 
which attention to governance rose sharply.  
The number of media articles about governance, and the number of resolutions about 
corporate governance submitted by institutional investors (many of which focused on key 
provisions of the governance indices),  jumped sharply in the beginning of the 2000s to 
historically high levels and remained there. Academic research, proxied by the fraction of 
National Bureau of Economic Research  (NBER)  discussion papers related to corporate 
governance, also rose sharply around this point in time, with the GIM paper being issued as an 
NBER discussion paper in 2001. Given our findings about the relationship between attention to 
governance and returns to the governance strategies, we proceed to test the hypothesis that, by 
the end of 2001, markets had sufficiently absorbed the governance differences reflected in the G-
Index and the E-Index.  
In particular, we examine whether, by the end of 2001, market participants learned to 
appreciate the differences between well-governed firms and poorly governed firms in terms of 
their expected future profitability. In particular, we examine the extent to which markets were 
differentially surprised by earning announcements as proxied by (i) the abnormal reactions 
accompanying earning announcements, and (ii) analyst forecast errors. Consistent with the 
learning hypothesis, we find a marked difference between the 1990–2001 and 2002–2008 
periods. During the 1990–2001 period, but not during the 2002–2008 period, the earning 
announcements of good-governance firms were more likely than the earning announcements of 
poor-governance firms both (i) to be accompanied with more positive abnormal stock returns,   4 
and (ii) to produce a meaningful positive surprise relative to the median analyst forecast. Our 
analysis here extends the studies of Core et al. (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011), which 
examine (with mixed results) whether the correlation between governance and returns was due to 
markets’ forecasting errors about the difference between good-governance and poor-governance 
firms, but which did not consider whether such forecasting errors changed over time during the 
1990–2008 period.  
Under the learning hypothesis, while the governance indices can be expected at some point to 
cease to be correlated with abnormal trading profits, as their relevance for firm value and 
performance becomes incorporated into market prices, the correlation of these indices with firm 
value and performance can be expected to persist.  We find that, indeed, the relationship that the 
governance indices have with Tobin’s Q  and various measures of operating performance 
remained strong during the  2000s (and, if anything, becomes more significant in the 2002–2008 
period).
2  Thus, while governance indices may no longer be able to provide a basis for a 
profitable trading strategy, they should remain valuable tools for researchers, investors, and 
policy-makers interested in governance and its relationship with firm performance. 
We also explore an alternative explanation that has been suggested in the literature to the 
correlation between governance and returns identified for the 1990s. Under this explanation, 
governance is correlated with some common risk factor that is not captured by the standard four-
factor model used by GIM to calculate abnormal returns (Core et al., 2006; Cremers et al., 2009). 
Under this explanation, governance can be expected to continue to play a role in explaining the 
cross-section of returns as long as the common risk factor correlated with governance continues 
to have such a role. To investigate this possibility, we examine the consequences of augmenting 
the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model with additional common factors suggested in the 
literature—the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), the downside risk factor of Ang 
et al. (2006), and the takeover factor of Cremers et al. (2009). We find that adding these factors 
cannot fully explain both the existence of the governance-returns correlation and its subsequent 
disappearance.  
                                                 
2 Our results concerning the persistence of the relationship with Tobin’s Q and operating performance are 
consistent with those obtained for 2000–2006 by Cremers and Ferrell (2010) and Giroud and Mueller 
(2011), though these studies do not relate this persistence to the learning hypothesis.     5 
Finally, we conduct three types of robustness checks for our results concerning how the 
periods 1990–2001 and 2002–2008 differ in terms of the association of abnormal returns with the 
governance indices, as well as in the ability of investors and analysts to forecast the differences 
in expected future earnings between good-governance and poor-governance firms. In particular, 
we examine whether our results are robust to excluding new economy firms (Murphy, 2003), to 
excluding firms in the most competitive industries (Giroud and Mueller, 2011), and to adjusting 
returns to take into account industry effects (Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu, 2009; Lewellen 
and Metrick, 2010). We find that our findings concerning the differences between 1990–2001 
and 2002–2008 are all robust to these issues.
3  
In addition to the literature on governance indices and governance provisions, our paper is 
related to the large body of asset pricing and behavioral finance literature on the persistence and 
disappearance of abnormal returns associated with trading strategies based on public 
information. Trading strategies based on known information that produce risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns over significant periods of time have sometimes been labeled as “anomalies” (see, e.g., 
Schwert, 2003). Researchers have paid close attention to the extent to which such “anomalies” 
have persisted after they were documented by academic research, with some suggesting that it is 
reasonable to expect anomalies not to persist for long after they are reported (Cochrane, 1999). 
While classical efficient capital market theory (Fama,  1970) questions whether public 
information can ever be used to produce abnormal returns, adaptive efficient capital market 
theory (Daniel and Titman, 1999) suggests that the ability of any trading strategy based on public 
information to generate risk-adjusted abnormal profits will dissipate over time.  
Estimating the future effects of (publicly known) governance provisions (or governance 
characteristics correlated with them) is far from a straightforward matter, and requires not only 
knowing the public information about the provisions but also plugging it into an appropriate 
structural model of the firms and their environment. Our evidence is consistent with such a 
process being one that takes time to develop, refine, and to accurately execute. As Brav and 
                                                 
3 While we focus on the differences between 1990–2001 and the period following it, we do not have the 
data to study how the 1990–2001 period differed from years preceding it. Cremers and Ferrell (2010) 
introduce a new data  set of governance provisions from the pre-1990 period and suggest that the 
association between governance and returns during the pre-1990 period, when legal rules making 
entrenching provisions more consequential were developed, was especially strong.    6 
Heaton (2002) show, such a pattern is consistent with two models (that are difficult to distinguish 
empirically): (i) a “rational structure uncertainty” model in which all agents were uncertain in 
1990 what structural model to use to make rational predictions from available public 
information, but learned to do so over time; and (ii) a “behavioral” model in which some rational 
investors (but not others) were able to draw accurate inferences from governance provisions 
already in 1990, but “limits on arbitrage” (Shleifer and Vishny,  1997)  prevented their 
information from being fully reflected in prices, and in which, over time, such rational investors 
grew sufficiently in number and confidence for their information to be factored into market 
prices. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the relationship 
between the governance indices and returns during the 1990–2008 period. Section 3, the main 
part of our analysis, investigates the causes of both the existence of a governance-returns 
association during the 1990s and its subsequent disappearance. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The governance-returns association and its disappearance 
2.1. The IRRC data set and summary statistics 
Our data sample consists of all the companies included in the eight volumes published by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), where the volumes were published on the 
following dates: September, 1990; July, 1993; July, 1995; February, 1998; November, 1999; 
February, 2002; January, 2004; and January, 2006. We do not use the 2008 vintage of 
RiskMetrics governance data because it is not comparable with data in the earlier IRRC volumes: 
in 2007, RiskMetrics acquired IRRC and revamped its data collection methods; consequently, 
changes were made both in the set of provisions covered and in the definitions of some of the 
covered provisions. For example, only 18 of the 24 provisions in the G-Index are covered by the 
2008 volume of the RiskMetrics governance data. 
Each IRRC volume tracks corporate governance provisions for between 1,400 to 2,000 firms. 
In addition to all the firms belonging to the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500, each IRRC volume 
also covers other firms considered to be important by the IRRC. Following GIM (2003) and 
subsequent work in the literature, we exclude dual-class firms and real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) because of the unique governance structures and regulations prevailing for these sets of 
firms.    7 
We construct an annual time series of the G-Index and E-Index following the forward-fill 
method of GIM (2003): we assume that the governance provisions remain unchanged from the 
current date of one volume until the current date of the next volume. Since IRRC publishes a 
new volume between every two to three years, we fill forward for 2.5 years the data in the last 
(2006) IRRC volume, until June 2008.
4  
We follow the construction of the G-Index (which is based on 24 IRRC provisions) defined 
by GIM and the construction of the E-Index (which is based on six provisions) defined by BCF. 
Because the provisions in these indices restrict shareholder rights, a high score is viewed as 
representing worse governance. Following GIM, we define Democracy (G) firms and 
Dictatorship (G) firms as firms that have especially good governance and especially bad 
governance, respectively, based on the extremes of the G-Index. In particular, Democracy (G) 
firms are those whose G-Index score is 5 or lower, and Dictatorship (G) firms are those whose 
G-Index score is 14 or higher. In an analogous fashion, we create groups of firms whose scores 
are the very best and the very worst using the E-Index: we define Democracy (E) firms and 
Dictatorship (E) firms to be those with E-Index scores of zero and E-Index scores of 5 or higher, 
respectively. 
Table 1, Panel A reports summary statistics concerning the governance indices. Rows 1–4 
report a volume-by-volume breakdown of the G-Index and E-Index, and the percentage of the 
firms in each volume that are Democracy or Dictatorship firms using each of the indices.  
We match each firm’s monthly governance data with its monthly returns from The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and then construct both market-value-weighted and equal-
weighted portfolios based on governance indices scores. Following GIM, we construct 
governance portfolios based on holding long Democracy firms and shorting Dictatorship firms. 
Portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each month and governance data are  updated 
whenever information in a new IRRC volume becomes available. The trading strategy is carried 
out for the period from September 1990, the first publication date of IRRC volumes, until June  
2008.   
                                                 
4 Filling forward for two years only or for three full years does not materially change the results in our 
paper.   8 
Table 1, Panel B reports the average raw (unadjusted for risk) monthly portfolio returns from 
the four governance trading strategies—value- and equal-weighted, using the G-Index and E-
Index—between each pair of successive IRRC volumes. These statistics indicate that, for each of 
the four strategies, average monthly portfolio returns were high during the September 1990–
December 1999 period examined by GIM, but dropped in the latter half of our sample period 
(the January 2000–June 2008 period).  
 
2.2. Governance and abnormal returns 1990–2008 
The above monthly returns produced by the governance-based strategies do not account for 
their associations with systematic risks. To test whether the governance-based strategies yield 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns, we use (as done by GIM, 2003 and BCF, 2009) the standard 
four-factor model based on the three factors of Fama-French (1993) augmented by the 
momentum factor of Carhart (1997). In particular, we divide the sample period into the two 
periods 1990–1999 and 2000–2008, where the former matches the period studied by GIM. For 
each period, we run a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the four factors, and report the 
results in Table 2.  
For the first period of 1990–1999, we find economically and statistically significant 
abnormal returns for all four trading strategies. The value-weighted (equal-weighted) portfolio 
formed on the G-Index produces average abnormal monthly returns of 69 (49) basis points, with 
statistical significance at the 1% (5%) level. Our results replicate those in GIM, who report the 
value- (equal-) weighted monthly portfolio return over the same period of 72 (45) basis points. 
We obtain similar, but stronger, results using E-Index-based portfolios. The value- and equal-
weighted portfolios produce average abnormal monthly returns of 123 and 60 basis points, 
respectively, both statistically significant at the 1% level. We use White (1980) robust standard 
errors to alleviate concerns that the time-series residuals from the factor regressions are 
heteroskedastic. However, the use of standard ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors does 
not change our inferences in any of the factor regressions in Table 2 or in the subsequent Tables 
3, 4, and 9.  
The results for the second period of 2000–2008 are strikingly different. For this period, both 
the value- and equal-weighted portfolios based on the G-Index or the E-Index produce average 
monthly abnormal returns that are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, combined with 
our findings in the raw portfolio returns, the profitability of trading strategies based on the G-  9 
Index and the E-Index, either adjusted or unadjusted for risk factors, appears to wane in the 
2000s.  
Fig.  1  plots  the cumulative abnormal monthly returns using  three-year rolling average 
monthly abnormal returns. At the beginning of each month, we estimate over the next 36 months 
average abnormal returns, and we cumulate them over our sample period. As Fig. 1 shows, for 
all four governance strategies, the cumulative excess returns are monotonically increasing during 
the 1990s and subsequently flatten until the end of our sample period.  
Last row of Table 2 reports the performance of the governance strategies for the period 
1990–2008 as a whole. Consistent with the picture emerging from Fig. 1, three of the four 
governance strategies produce positive and significant (at the 1% confidence level) average 
monthly abnormal returns over the entire period. However, as was shown above, this 
performance of the governance strategies is generated entirely during the 1990–1999 period, and 
these strategies produce subsequently returns that are indistinguishable from zero.   
 
3. Learning and the returns to governance indices 
3.1. The learning hypothesis 
What can explain the  abnormal returns associated with governance strategies during the 
1990s? In considering this question, it is important to note that the legal developments that 
shaped the significance of the governance provisions in the G-Index and the E-Index were 
largely in place during by the beginning of the 1990s. During the 1980s, the Delaware courts 
issued rulings, culminating with the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Paramount 
Communications v. Time, Inc.,  expanding the power of boards to use governance provisions to 
“just say no” to acquisition offers they view as undesirable. It is thus difficult to explain the 
abnormal returns associated with the G-Index and the E-Index during the 1990s as the product of 
legal changes increasing the significance of the provisions in these governance indices.  
For this reason, GIM and subsequent work viewed the association between the G-Index and 
returns for the 1990s as being due to (i) learning: an inability by market participants in 1990, 
facing a landscape of provisions and applicable rules that had substantially evolved and changed 
during the 1980s, to forecast accurately the significance of governance for the expected future   10 
performance of firms; or (ii) model misspecification: an association between governance and a 
common risk factor that is not captured by the four-factor model.
5 Our finding that the identified 
association between governance indices and returns did not persist after the 1990s raises the 
question of whether any of the two explanations offered for the existence of the associations 
during the 1990s could also explain the subsequent disappearance of the association.  
Under the learning hypothesis (i), which is the focus of the investigations in this section, 
market prices in the 1990s had not yet precisely priced the expected effects of the differences 
between well-governed and poorly  governed firms on future profitability, but over time,  a 
sufficient number of market participants have learned to appreciate the significance of these 
differences, making trading on the basis of such differences no longer profitable. The learning 
hypothesis accepts that it might have been difficult for market participants to forecast precisely 
how governance provisions would affect the future performance of firms overall. This overall 
effect combines many effects, some of which go in opposite directions, which in turn depend on 
how provisions interact with each other and with legal rules. Forecasting this overall effect on a 
priori  theoretical grounds was clearly difficult. Furthermore, even assuming that some 
arbitrageurs of superior ability were able to make precise predictions in this connection, their 
activities might not have been sufficient to get the market prices of IRRC firms to fully reflect 
their forecasts: the firms in the IRRC universe represent the lion’s share of the US capital 
markets, and there are limits to the amount of capital any arbitrageur can commit to a given long-
term trading strategy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
While market prices in 1990 might not have reflected a precise forecast of the differences 
between good-governance and poor-governance firms in terms of future performance, market 
participants might have gained over time a better appreciation of these differences. Under the 
learning hypothesis, the association between the governance indices and abnormal returns ceases 
to exist once market participants with sufficient capital have gained sufficient appreciation of 
these differences for market prices to reflect such appreciation, which in turn makes it no longer 
possible to profit by trading on the basis of the governance indices.  
                                                 
5 Explanation (i) seems to have been favored by GIM, and Explanation (ii) was favored by Core et al. 
(2006) and Cremers et al. (2009).    11 
In the remainder of this Section 3, we investigate the possibility that the learning hypothesis 
can explain both the association between governance indices and returns and its subsequent 
disappearance. We begin by analyzing the association between returns to governance portfolios 
and attention to governance among a broad range of players—the media, institutional investors, 
and academic researchers (Section 3.2). Subsequently, to examine whether market participants 
made governance-related expectational errors during the learning period but not afterwards, we 
examine market reactions to earning announcements (Section 3.3) as well as analyst surprises by 
such announcements (Section 3.4). Next, we show that, consistent with the learning hypothesis, 
the relationship that the governance indices have with Tobin’s Q and operating performance 
persist throughout 1990–2008 (Section 3.5). We then consider factors suggested in the literature 
for augmenting the four-factor model, and find that they cannot explain the existence of a 
governance-returns correlation during 1990–2001 and its subsequent disappearance (Section 
3.6). Finally, we show that our results are robust to excluding new economy firms or firms from 
competitive industries and to industry-adjustment of returns (Section 3.7).  
 
3.2. Returns to governance strategies and attention to governance 
 
3.2.1. Measuring attention to governance 
We begin by looking at several quantitative measures that reflect the evolution over time in 
the attention paid to governance by relevant players. Below we examine, in turn, the attention 
paid to governance by the media, institutional investors, and academic researchers. In all cases, 
we find that the level of attention rose in the beginning of the 2000s to levels much higher than 
those of the 1990s and subsequently remained high until the end of our sample period.  
(i) The media: We begin by looking at references in the media to corporate governance. 
Media references to and coverage of corporate governance may be relevant for two reasons: 
greater attention by journalists to governance issues may be a mechanism for information 
diffusion, influencing market participants and leading them to pay more attention to such issues; 
and, given that journalists talk with and write for market participants, media coverage may also 
partly reflect (rather than bring about) a greater interest in these issues on the part of market 
participants.  
To obtain a quantitative proxy for the media interest in governance, we search through Lexis-
Nexis Academic and tally, in each calendar year, the number of unique newspaper articles that   12 
reference the word “corporate governance” from four of the most widely followed newspapers, 
namely, USA Today, New York Times, Washington Post, and the Financial Times. We normalize 
the number of articles by their 1990 values and plot in Fig. 2(A) the time series. These time 
series exhibit a slow, gradual increase during the 1990s, then a steep jump from 2001 to 2002, 
with interest subsequently remaining at a level much higher than during the 1990s.  
(ii) Institutional investors: We also examine the attention paid to corporate governance by 
institutional investors. In particular, using the annual proxy season reviews of Georgeson 
Shareholder, we collect the total number of corporate governance shareholder resolutions 
submitted by institutional investors in each proxy season since 1990, normalizing each year’s 
figure by the 1990 counts.  We plot the time series in Fig. 2(B).  
Here we see that the incidence of such shareholder proposals fluctuates between 1990 and 
2002, rising steeply in the 2003 proxy season and subsequently remaining at levels that are 
substantially higher than those prevailing prior to the sharp rise. Because shareholder proposals 
need to be submitted substantially early in advance of the shareholder meeting, proposals for the 
proxy season of 2003 were largely submitted in 2002. Thus, Fig. 2(B) reflects a sharp rise in 
attention given to corporate governance already taking place in 2002, in the form of a rising 
tendency of institutional investors to submit corporate governance proposals.  
Indeed, Georgeson (2003) lists all the corporate governance proposals submitted by 
institutional investors for vote during the 2003 proxy season, and a review of this list reveals that 
some of the most common types of proposals, and the ones attracting the most support from 
shareholders in shareholder votes, were ones focusing on key provisions of the E-Index and the 
G-Index. In particular, a substantial fraction of all the corporate governance proposals submitted 
by institutions and voted upon during the 2003 proxy season concerned staggered boards, poison 
pills, or golden parachutes—all elements of the E-Index (as well  as, of course, the broader 
G-Index). Furthermore, each of these three types of proposals attracted, on average, a majority of 
the votes cast by shareholders.  
(iii) Academic research:  We next look at the attention paid to governance by academic 
researchers. Academic research can provide market participants with ideas and findings that are 
directly relevant to the choices they make, and it can also influence the choice of issues to which 
they pay attention.  
Academic papers are often published a significant time after they are written and first 
circulated (as most academic readers of this paper probably painfully recognize). Researchers   13 
affiliated with the NBER issue and circulate completed studies in this form, often substantially 
before their papers are published in journals. We therefore look at the NBER working paper 
database and search for a number of newly issued working papers that reference the term 
“corporate governance.” Fig. 2(C) reports in time series the fraction of new NBER working 
papers that are related to corporate governance in each year. This time series reveals similar time 
trends as the previous figures, showing that research on corporate governance increased 
considerably from 1998 to 2004, and that it remained subsequently at a much higher level than 
prior to this increase.  
Overall, we see that the attention paid by academic researchers to governance has risen 
considerably around the 2001–2002 period in which interest from non-academics (the media and 
institutional investors) rose sharply. The substantial increase in the level of academic interest was 
spread over a somewhat longer period, starting to climb even before the jump in attention by the 
media and institutions, and continued climbing a bit after this jump.  
The GIM study itself was issued as an NBER discussion paper in August 2001, and its 
findings were already noted by the media in the fall of 2001. The New York Times dedicated its 
trading strategies column, and the Financial Times dedicated its global investing column, to 
reporting about GIM’s findings concerning the abnormal returns associated with governance 
strategies.
6  
(iv) The attention index: To aggregate the different proxies for attention described above, we 
construct an attention index as follows: for each one of the attention measures, we estimate for 
each month the 12-month rolling average, normalize it by the 1990 value of this measure, and 
then take the arithmetic average across the three measures to get the monthly value of the 
attention index.
7 As expected, Fig. 2(D) reveals a pattern consistent with those above: in the 
beginning of the 2000s there was a sharp increase in the level of the attention index, which 
subsequently remains at such high levels. In the following section, we revisit the learning 
hypothesis and attempt to make a linkage between governance-based abnormal returns and the 
attention index.  
                                                 
6 See Alison Beard, “Shareholder-friendly companies outperform,” Financial Times, November 9, 2001; 
Mark Hulbert, “Who best protects shareholders? The shareholders,” New York Times, November 4, 2001.  
7 For shareholder proposals, we have only yearly data, and we assume that the proposals are evenly 
distributed among the months of the year.    14 
 
3.2.2. Governance alphas and the attention index 
The patterns we show above beg the question of what is the relationship between governance 
abnormal returns and the attention given to corporate governance. We examine this question in 
two ways. First, we regress the raw governance portfolios on the four factors as before, but 
include interactions of each of the four factors and the constant term with quintile ranks of the 
attention index, where the first quintile is denoted as 0 and the fifth quintile denoted as 4. In this 
regression, the constant term represents the average abnormal return at the lowest level (i.e., first 
quintile) of attention paid to corporate governance.  
Results of this regression are reported in Panel A of Table 3, in which we find that the value- 
(equal-) weighted G-Index portfolios produce an average of 70 (51) basis points per month when 
attention to governance is at the first quintile, but decrease by 23 (9) basis points per month for 
each quintile increase in the attention index, so that when the attention index reaches the 3
rd (4
th) 
quintile, alphas are no longer positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the 
value- (equal-) weighted E-Index portfolios produce an average of 140 (52) basis points per 
month when attention to governance is at the first quintile, but decrease by 32 (4) basis points for 
each quintile increase in the attention index, so that when the attention index reaches the 4
rd (5
th) 
quintile, alphas are no longer positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Another method by which we explore the association between governance abnormal returns 
and the attention paid to governance is by explicitly estimating the evolution of these abnormal 
returns over time and examining their association with the attention index. In particular, we first 
estimate for each month in the sample, the average monthly abnormal returns over the previous 
36 months; then we regress these 36-month rolling alphas on the quintile ranks of the attention 
index. Panel B of Table 3 reports the estimation results. Because rolling alphas are expected (by 
construction) to have a high degree of time-series correlation, we use Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors with 36 lags.  
Results from this regression show that the value- (equal-) weighted G-Index abnormal returns 
are, on average, 71 (36) basis points per month when attention to governance is at the first 
quintile, but decrease by 18 (3) basis points per month for each quintile increase in the attention 
index, so that when the attention index reaches the 4
th (5
th) quintile, rolling alphas are no longer 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the value- (equal-) weighted 
E-Index abnormal returns are, on average, 114 (59) basis points per month when attention to   15 
governance is at the first quintile, but decrease by 22 (5) basis points for each quintile increase in 
the attention index, so that when the attention index reaches the 5
th quintile, alphas are no longer 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Overall, the two sets of regressions in Table 3 show consistent patterns in the association 
between governance abnormal returns and the attention paid to corporate governance. Alphas 
from governance portfolios decreased to zero as the attention paid to corporate governance 
heightened.  
 
3.2.3. Structural break in returns to governance 
In this subsection we take another look at the relationship between returns to governance 
strategies and attention to governance. In particular, we analyze whether it is possible to locate a 
structural break in the pattern of returns and if so, how it relates to the period in which attention 
to governance rose sharply. As we have seen, the attention paid to governance by both the media 
and institutional investors rose sharply in 2002. By then, interest by academics had been already 
rising for several years, and continued rising a bit afterwards. The sharp rise in attention to 
governance from the media and institutional investors might have been due to the “shock” 
created by the governance scandals of Enron, Worldcom, and others, and to the accompanying 
governance reforms (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the new listing requirements). The preceding 
and accompanying rise in academic research on the subject might have further contributed to the 
increased attention to governance. Whatever the reasons for the increased attention to 
governance, the patterns displayed above make it clear that among media journalists, institutional 
investors, and academic researchers, the levels of interest in governance from at least 2002 
onward were considerably higher than those prevailing during most of the 1990s.  
With any learning process, there is no reason to expect that it ever reaches a point in which 
all  market participants recognize the significance of certain factors. What matters is when 
learning reaches a point in which profits from trading based on these factors are no longer 
possible because a sufficient number of market participants with sufficient capital have 
recognized the issue.  
Given that we have shown that 1) governance trading strategies ceased to produce abnormal 
stock returns in the 2000s and 2) the level of interest in governance in several important sets of 
players reached historically high levels in the early 2000s, we explore below the relationship 
between governance alphas and the attention paid to governance, and we attempt to identify a   16 
structural break point in governance alphas. Finally, we test the hypothesis that, by the end of 
2001, sufficient learning had taken place for market prices to internalize the significance of 
governance sufficiently for abnormal profits based on the governance indices to be no longer 
possible. We find below evidence that is consistent with the learning hypothesis.  
As we saw from the figures about attention, there is a big jump in attention in the beginning 
of the 2000s, roughly when we stop finding abnormal returns when we look at four-year periods. 
To study the issue more carefully, we begin by examining whether one can locate a structural 
break in the abnormal returns. In particular, we employ the Quandt (1960) procedure for 
identifying a structural break with a single unknown break point: we seek to identify the point in 
time in our sample in which the period prior to and the period after which the abnormal returns 
are most “different” statistically. Specifically, we estimate the following regression (1) for a 
sequence of all possible break points in the data.  
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For each breakpoint (year and month in the sample), we estimate (1) using POST as an 
indicator variable for any point in time including and after the break point, and we compute the 
F-statistic on the coefficient on POST (α∆) for each regression. The estimated structural break 
point is the year and month which yields the largest F-statistic over all possible break points in 
the estimation sample. Note that in employing the procedure, we consider break points from only 
the middle 85% of the sample (i.e., 15% trimming) to ensure sufficient data to estimate the 
coefficients on the intercept α and on POST. In Table 4 Panel A we find the G-Index value- and 
equal-weighted, and the E-Index value-  and equal-weighted portfolio returns to have break 
points in abnormal returns occurring on May 2000, September 2001, August 2000, and 
December 2000, respectively. On average, the break point in abnormal governance returns 
suggested by the Quandt procedure occurred in November 2000.
8  
                                                 
8 We use the asymptotic distribution developed by Andrews (1993) for the maximum F-statistic to test the 
null hypothesis that α∆= 0 (that is, the change in post-period abnormal returns) for each of the estimated 
break points, and we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level for the value-weighted portfolios but not 
for the equal-weighted portfolios.    17 
The above procedure provides an estimate for a discrete break, occurring fully at one point in 
time, in governance alphas; however, under the learning hypothesis, we would not necessarily 
expect any structural breaks to occur discretely when learning takes place over some time. Under 
this view, one might be interested in identifying a point in time (“critical learning point”) at 
which the market has sufficiently learned to appreciate the difference between good versus bad 
governance firms, and after which point there are no more abnormal returns associated with 
governance-based trading strategies.  
While no test can allow us to identify such a point exactly, we can seek to approximate the 
location of this point as follows. Under gradual learning, the above Quandt procedure will 
identify a point in time that is likely to be in the middle of the learning process and prior to the 
critical learning point. As an alternative, we attempt to approximate the critical learning point by 
estimating, for each governance portfolio, rolling 36-month alphas (as laid out in Section 3.2.2) 
and identifying the first point in time (year and month) in our sample period in which all 
subsequent rolling alphas are no longer statistically distinguishable from zero. In Panel A of 
Table 4 we find that such a point occurs on March 2002, December 2002, January 2003, and July 
2002 for the G-Index value- and equal-weighted, and the E-Index value- and equal-weighted 
portfolios, respectively. On average,  across the four governance portfolios considered, after 
August 2002 we find no more positive and statistically significant abnormal returns associated 
with governance trading strategies.  
By construction, we should expect the point in time identified by this procedure to occur after 
the critical learning point, since the rolling alphas are estimated based on trailing 36-month data. 
Combined, the Quandt procedure should provide a lower bound for the critical learning point 
while the rolling alpha procedure should provide an upper bound for the critical learning point. 
Indeed, in our data we find that for each of the four governance portfolios considered, the break 
point identified by the Quandt procedure always precedes that obtained from the rolling alpha 
procedure.  
Using the midpoint between the two dates as an approximation for the critical learning point, 
we find that this point occurs on March 2001, April 2002, October 2001, and September 2001 for 
the G-Index value- and equal-weighted, and the E-Index value- and equal-weighted portfolios, 
respectively. On average, we estimate the critical learning point to have occurred on October 
2001. In other words, approximately by the end of 2001,  sufficient learning about the   18 
significance of governance had occurred and markets have learned to appreciate the differences 
between good versus bad governance firms. 
In Panel B of Table 4  we examine and compare the abnormal returns to governance 
portfolios for the 1991–2001 period and the post-2001 period of 2002–2008 by again regressing 
monthly returns of each governance strategy on the four factors. This time, however, we add a 
post-2001 time dummy, labeled “POST,” as well as interactions between each of the four factors 
with POST to account for the possibility that sensitivities to the factors may have also changed 
after 2001. Columns 1–4 report the estimation results of the regression using monthly returns 
from value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios formed by going long the Democracy 
portfolio and short the Dictatorship portfolio based on the G-Index and the E-Index.  
We find that all four trading strategies produce an average monthly alpha that is 
economically and statistically significant (at the 5% level) during the period 1990–2001. For our 
purposes, what is of special interest is the sum of the coefficients on the Alpha and POST 
variables, which reflects the post-2001 average monthly alpha. In all the columns, applying an 
F-test to the sum of the coefficients on Alpha and POST shows that, for the period 2002–2008, 
none of the four portfolios produces abnormal returns that are statistically different from zero at 
the 5% level. Specifically, the G-Index (E-Index) value-weighted portfolio produces 57 (111) 
basis points in the pre-period; the difference in the post-period abnormal monthly returns is very 
close in magnitude and statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level at -92 (-113) basis points, 
resulting in a post-period abnormal monthly return that is statistically no different from zero at 
the 5% level. The G-Index (E-Index) equal-weighted portfolio produces abnormal monthly 
returns of 49 (54) basis points in the pre-period which is statistically significant at the 5% (1%) 
level; F-test results show again that abnormal returns in the post-2001 period are not statistically 
different from zero at the 5% level.  
 
3.3. Stock market reactions to earnings announcements 
Following the approach introduced by LaPorta et al. (1997), we turn to market reactions to 
earnings announcements as a tool for examining the extent to which markets were able to 
forecast differences in future profitability among firms. To the extent that market participants did 
not fully appreciate differences between well-governed and poorly governed firms during the 
1990–2001 period, we expect the market to be more positively surprised by the earnings 
announcements of good-governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms. In contrast, to   19 
the extent that market participants in the aggregate had sufficiently learned to appreciate the 
difference between good-governance and poor-governance firms by the end of 2001, we should 
see no association between governance indices and market surprises around earnings 
announcements during the post-2001 period.  
We construct a data set of quarterly earnings announcements data for firms in the IRRC data 
set.  Earnings announcements are obtained from  The Insitutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S), for which we require each announcement to have at least one analyst forecast 30 days 
prior to the announcement, to have coverage in Compustat, and have returns data in CRSP. The 
resulting sample includes 100,317 earnings announcements from September 1990 to June 2008. 
As before, we remove all dual-class firms and REITs, leaving a total of 89,339 announcements. 
Announcement dates are obtained by combining I/B/E/S and Compustat; following DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2009), in cases where I/B/E/S and Compustat announcement dates differ, we assign 
the announcement date to be the earlier of the two dates.
9  
Around these announcement dates we compute stock returns. Following prior work (see, for 
example, Core et al., 2006), we consider the following earnings announcement return windows: 
from 20, 10, 5, 3, and 1 trading days prior to the earnings announcement until one day after the 
announcement. In addition to raw returns, we also calculate risk-adjusted excess returns as 
described below.  
Following Giroud and Mueller (2011), we exclude from our regressions firms that are 
followed by fewer than five analysts. Firms in the IRRC data set are covered, on average, by nine 
analysts, and the excluded firms constitute less than 4.8% of the total market capitalization of 
IRRC firms. Firms followed by a significant number of analysts are the ones that attract 
significant attention from market participants and thus those with respect to which learning is 
more likely to occur. Our results continue to hold, but their statistical significance weakens 
somewhat, if we include firms that are followed by fewer than five analysts.  
                                                 
9 Searching through Lexis-Nexis for the actual announcement date in the PR newswires, DellaVigna and 
Pollet (2009) find that the reported announcement date often reflects the date of publication in the Wall 
Street Journal, which may occur later than the actual announcement. In cases of disagreement among 
I/B/E/S and Compustat, the earlier date tends to be the correct one, while the latter date tends to reflect 
the WSJ publication date.    20 
We begin by regressing returns accompanying earnings announcements on a governance 
index, the POST variable indicating whether the observation is from the post-2001 period, and an 
interaction of the governance index with the POST variable.  
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Under the learning hypothesis we are testing, we expect to see i) higher returns around the 
announcements of good-governance firms during 1990–2001 (β1 < 0), and ii) no association 
between governance and announcement returns during the post-2001 period (β1 + β3 = 0).   
Columns 1–5 of Table 5 Panel A (B) report pooled OLS estimation results using the G-Index 
(E-Index). Each column looks at returns in one of the five windows of different lengths we 
examine. To account for possible autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation in quarterly 
earnings surprises (e.g., see Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990), we report two-way cluster robust 
standard errors, clustering by firm and by year-quarter.
10  
In  all  ten regressions,  the coefficient on the governance index used  is negative, with 
statistical significance at the 5%  level  in  nine regressions.  Thus, whether using the G-  or 
E-Index, and whatever window around the earnings  announcement is used, the evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that market participants were more positively surprised by the 
earnings  announcements of good-governance firms than by the announcements of poor-
governance firms during the period 1990–2001. While we get statistical significance using either 
the G-  or E-Index,  all  of  our results using the E-Index are statistically stronger than the 
corresponding results using the G-Index. 
In addition, in all ten regressions in Panel A, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
the POST variable and the governance index used is positive, with statistical significance at the 
5% (10%) level for eight (nine) of the ten regressions. This evidence is consistent with a post-
2001 erosion in the differential between good-governance and poor-governance firms in terms of 
generating positive market surprises by earnings announcements.  
                                                 
10 Recent literature (e.g., see Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010) has shown that in panel data settings where 
cross-sectional and time-series correlations exist in the error term, standard error estimates that account 
for only one of the two types of correlations can be often be downward-biased.    21 
Furthermore, in most of the ten regressions, the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) is 
similar in magnitude to the coefficient on the governance index used in the regressions (β1). 
Indeed, in all ten regressions of Panels A and B, F-test results show that the relationship between 
governance and earnings surprises post-2001, β1 + β3, is statistically indistinguishable from zero 
at the 10% level. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that, by the end of 2001, 
the market had developed sufficiently accurate expectations for how differences between good-
governance and poor-governance firms can be expected to manifest themselves in earnings 
announcements.  
As a robustness check, we rerun all of the regressions using as a dependent variable the risk-
adjusted excess returns in our various announcement windows rather than the raw returns. 
Specifically, we estimate each firm’s loadings on the Fama-French (1993) three factors using 
data from 21 to 210 trading days prior to the announcement date. Using each firm’s estimated 
factor sensitivities, we risk-adjust returns around announcements as follows:
11   
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 (t – τ,t + 1) is the excess returns for firm i from τ trading days prior to until one trading 
day after the announcement date (t), and ri (t – τ,t + 1), rmktrf (t – τ,t + 1), rsmb (t – τ,t + 1), and rhml 
(t – τ,t + 1) are raw returns over the same period for firm i, the market factor (Mkt-Rf) factor, 
“small (market capitalization) minus big” (SMB) factor, and the “high (book-to-market ratio) 
minus low” (HML) factor, respectively.  
Columns 6–10 of Table 5 Panel A (B) report regression results using the G-Index (E-Index). 
Our results are largely consistent with those obtained using raw returns. In particular, the 
coefficient  on  the governance index (β1) is negative in all ten regressions and statistically 
significant in nine of them (at the 1% level in eight of them); moreover, the coefficient on the 
interaction term (β3) is positive in all ten regressions and statistically significant in nine of them 
(at the 5% level in eight of them). Furthermore, this coefficient is similar in magnitude to that of 
                                                 
11 Including the intercept term and compounding the returns does not alter our results.    22 
the governance index used, and F-tests indicate that, in all  ten regressions, β1  +  β3  is not 
statistically different from zero at the 10% level, consistent with the possibility that markets were 
not differentially surprised by good-governance and poor-governance firms after 2001. 
For robustness, we conduct further tests focusing on differences between firms with the best 
and worst governance scores, that is, firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios defined 
earlier. Table 6 reports estimation results of regressions that are similar to those reported in Table 
5  but that limit the universe of firms to Democracy and Dictatorship firms and replace the 
governance indices used earlier with the DEMOCRACY dummy, indicating whether the firm 
belongs to the Democracy portfolio (DEMOCRACY = 1) or the Dictatorship portfolio 
(DEMOCRACY = 0). We thus test whether β1 > 0 and β1+β3 = 0 in the following specification. 
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The organization of Table 6 follows the format of Table 5 and the results are similar. The 
coefficient on DEMOCRACY is positive in all regressions and statistically significant in all but 
one regression, consistent with the market being more positively surprised by the earnings 
announcements of Democracy firms than by those of Dictatorship firms during 1990–2001. The 
coefficients on the interaction between POST and DEMOCRACY are negative in all regressions 
and statistically significant in all but three regressions. Finally, F-tests show that in all regression 
specifications, β1 + β3 is not statistically different from zero, consistent with market participants 
no longer being differentially surprised by those two types of firms after 2001.  
Our conclusions with regards to the relation between earnings announcement returns and 
corporate governance in the period 1990–2001 differ from those reached by Core et al. (2006) 
for the period 1990–1999. These authors’  analysis is based on constructing value-weighted 
Democracy (G) and Dictatorship (G) quarterly earnings announcement portfolios. They find that, 
during the 1990–1999 period, the Democracy (G) quarterly earnings announcement portfolios, 
on average,  produce higher returns than those of the Dictatorship (G)  quarterly earnings 
announcement portfolios; they find such a positive difference in all of their eight specifications 
based on four announcement windows they examined and in both raw returns as well as in 
excess returns. However, these authors do not find these positive differences to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level in any of the specifications (although in some cases these differences 
are significant at the 10% level), and this lack of statistical significance leads them to conclude   23 
that, during the 1990s, the market was not more positively surprised by the quarterly 
announcements of Democracy (G) firms relative to Dictatorship (G) firms.  
Our analysis differs from that of Core et al. (2006) along several dimensions, including 
differences in data construction and estimation specifications. For example, unlike Core et al., 
we apply a data filter which excludes dual-class firms and REITs following GIM (2003) and 
excludes firms followed by fewer than five analysts following Giroud and Mueller (2011); and 
we use not only the G-Index on which Core et al. focus but also the E-Index.
12 In our online 
appendix, we replicate the results of Core et al., and conduct an analysis of what drives the 
differences between our results and theirs. This analysis indicates that the reasons why Core et 
al.  do not obtain statistical significance for the positive differences between announcement 
returns for Democracy and Dictatorship firms during 1990–1999 was due to these authors (i) not 
using  the above data filter, (ii) using only the G-Index and not also the E, and (iii) value-
weighting observations by using value-weighted portfolios. For example, repeating the value-
weighted portfolio analysis of Core et al. using the E-Index produces positive and statistically 
significant differences,  with  the magnitude and significance of these differences further 
strengthened when the above data filter is applied and/or when observations are equal-weighted 
by using equal-weighted portfolios.  
Before concluding this section’s analysis, we conduct another robustness check. In their 
analysis, Core et al. (2006) suggest that, in analyzing differences in abnormal returns between 
Democracy and Dictatorship firms during a period of X days following an earnings 
announcement, one should first reduce the returns of Democracy firms by the average over-
performance over the period of examination for a period of X days.
13 For completeness of our 
                                                 
12 Other ways in which our data construction and estimation specifications differ from those in Core et al. (2006) are 
as follows. First, our data sample for the period from September 1990 to December 1999 is somewhat larger (by 
about 5%) because we achieved a fuller merge between the IRRC, Compustat, and I/B/E/S. Second, we obtain 
announcement dates using the approach developed by Della Vigna and Pollet (2009) subsequent to the work of Core 
et al. (2006). Third, our overall sample contains more years, spanning from September 1990 to June 2008. Fourth, 
our estimation specifications use as units of observation firm-quarter earnings announcement returns; in contrast, 
Core et al. construct quarterly portfolios of earnings announcement returns.  
13 For example, when looking at a five-day window around earnings announcements, one first computes the average 
per-year abnormal returns R from a trading strategy that goes long a portfolio of Democracy firms and short a 
portfolio of Dictatorship firms (a la GIM). Then, to obtain the average outperformance of Democracy firms over a 
five-day window, one computes (1+R)
5/252-1. 
While Core et al. (2006) make such an adjustment, other studies that examine how abnormal returns are related 
to governance indices [e.g., the analysis by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) of how abnormal returns following 
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analysis, we check and report in our online appendix that our results are robust to making such 
an adjustment. In particular, we rerun all the specifications of Table 6 columns 6–10 (which 
focus on the differences in abnormal returns around earnings announcements between 
Democracy and Dictatorship firms) using such adjustments. With such adjustments, the 
regression coefficients decline in magnitude but they remain generally significant. 
14 
Thus, our findings in this section are consistent with the learning hypothesis that (i) during 
1990–2001 the market did not fully absorb the significance of the provisions in the governance 
indices and was consequently more positively surprised by the earnings announcements of good-
governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms, and (ii) after 2001, market participants 
sufficiently recognized the difference between good-governance and bad-governance firms so 
that they were not differentially surprised by the earnings announcements of these different types 
of firms. 
 
3.4. Analyst forecast surprises 
If the market was more likely to be positively surprised by the earnings announcements of 
some firms, one might also wonder whether analysts were also more positively surprised by the 
announcements of such firms. Because there is evidence indicating the possibility that  I/B/E/S 
data on analysts are not fully reliable (see, e.g., Ljungqvist et al., 2009), because stock prices are 
determined by market participants in the aggregate rather than analysts alone, and because the 
market learns a substantial amount of non-earnings-specific information around earnings 
announcements (see, e.g., Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2002; Hutton, 2005), we believe that 
tests based on differences between earnings announcements and analyst forecasts are likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
acquisition announcement are governance indices in general and differences between Democracy and Dictatorship 
firms in particular] do not make such adjustments. 
14 For example, after making such adjustments to the value-weighted portfolio approach of Core et al., we find that 
prior to the end of 2001, Democracy (G) [E] portfolios have statistically higher abnormal earnings announcement 
returns than the Dictatorship (G) [E] portfolios at the 10% level in 4 of the 5 [3 of the 5] event windows examined; 
however, post-2001 Democracy (G) [E] portfolios’ average abnormal earnings announcement returns are 
statistically no different than those of the Dictatorship (G) [E] portfolios at the 10% level in all 5 [4 of the 5] event 
windows examined. Similarly, by making such adjustments to an equal-weighted portfolio approach, we find that 
prior to the end of 2001, Democracy (G) [E] portfolios have statistically higher abnormal earnings announcement 
returns than the Dictatorship (G) [E] portfolios at the 10% level in 3 of the 5 [all 5] event windows examined; 
however, post-2001 Democracy (G) [E] portfolios’ average abnormal earnings announcement returns are 
statistically no different than those of the Dictatorship (G) [E] portfolios at the 10% level in 4 of the 5 [4 of the 5] 
event windows examined.   25 
less telling than tests based on market reactions reflected in stock returns. Nonetheless, we 
complement our analysis of such market reactions with an analysis of the relationship between 
analyst surprises and governance scores in different periods.   
We use analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S as in the previous section, and we again exclude firms 
followed by fewer than five analysts. We continue to use quarterly earnings announcements, 
matching them with the corresponding analyst forecasts. We define “consensus forecasted 
earning” as the mean analyst forecast on the closest date prior to the last day of the fiscal period, 
and define forecast error (FE) as equal to the actual earnings announced by a firm minus the 
consensus forecasted earnings. We chose quarterly earnings as the unit of analysis because such 
a choice is consistent with our earlier analysis on the returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements and because using quarterly earnings (as opposed to annual earnings) provides us 
with a more comprehensive sample of observations.  
The literature uses different measures of analyst surprise, with none appearing to be 
theoretically superior. We  therefore  examine four empirical measures of analyst surprise 
commonly used in the literature: forecast error scaled by price measured at the forecast date (FE 
scaled by price) (e.g., Core et al., 2006; Lim, 2001); forecast error scaled by total assets per share 
from the previous quarter end (FE scaled by assets) (e.g., Core et al., 2006; Giroud and Mueller, 
2011); forecast error scaled by the standard deviation of analyst forecasts (SUE)  (e.g., 
Mendenhall, 2004; Jegadeesh and Livnat, 2006); and the percent forecast error (FE (%)), i.e., 
forecast error scaled by the absolute value of mean analyst forecast (e.g., Philbrick and Ricks, 
1991; Higgins, 1996).   
Since all four analyst surprise variables are highly negatively skewed, we estimate quantile 
(median) regressions.
15  Specifically, for each of the surprise  variables, we estimate pooled 
median regressions  using as explanatory variables a governance variable (G-Index,  E-Index, 
Democracy (G), or Democracy (E)), the POST indicator for observations after 2001, and an 
interaction of the governance variable and the POST indicator. Following Core et al. (2006), we 
control for the log market capitalization and the log book-to-market ratio, both measured at the 
end of the previous fiscal quarter. Again, to account for the possibility of time-series as well as 
                                                 
15 In our sample, FE scaled by price, FE scaled by assets, SUE, and FE (%) exhibit skewness coefficients of -139.68, 
-22.33, -11.22, -20.74, respectively. The rule of thumb is that a skewness coefficient greater than 1.0 in absolute 
value indicates a highly skewed distribution (Bulmer, 1979).   26 
cross-sectional correlation in analyst surprises, we report bootstrapped two-way cluster robust 
standard errors, clustering by firm and year-quarter. Results of the pooled median regression 
estimation are reported in Panels A and B of Table 7.  
In general, our evidence on analyst surprises is consistent with the findings in Tables 5 and 6 
based on surprises captured in market reactions to earnings announcements. Specifically, we find 
that in the pre-2001 period, better-governed firms are more likely to have good surprises, and 
vice versa. The coefficients of the governance variables are negative in all eight regressions in 
Panel A, which use the G-Index (columns 1–4) and the E-Index (columns 5–8), and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in four out of the eight regressions. In particular, we obtain statistical 
significance in all four specifications using the E-Index.  
The coefficients of the governance variables are positive in five of the eight regressions in 
Panel B, which use the Democracy (G) (columns 1–4) and the Democracy (E) (columns 5–8), 
and statistically significant at the 5% level in four out of the eight regressions. Again, statistical 
significance is obtained for those specifications that use the Democracy (E) indicator. These 
findings  are  consistent with the possibility that, during the 1990–2001 period, earnings 
announcements of good-governance firms were more likely to represent a meaningful positive 
surprise relative to analyst forecasts than the announcements of poor-governance firms.   
In Panel A, we also find the coefficient on the interaction term between the governance 
variable and the POST indicator to be positive in five of the eight regressions, with statistical 
significance in three of them. Similarly, in Panel B we find the coefficient on the interaction term 
to be negative in five of the eight regressions, with statistical significance in three of them. 
Moreover, examining the sum of the coefficient of the governance variable and the variable 
interacting governance with POST, F-tests indicate that in 14 of the 16 regressions reported in 
Panels A and B of Table 7,  the associations between analyst  surprises  and governance are 
statistically  indistinguishable  from  zero  in the post-2001 period. This is consistent with the 
possibility that, after 2001, good-governance firms were no longer more likely to generate meani 
ngful analyst surprises than poor-governance firms.  
It is worth commenting on the relationship between our results in this section to those of 
Core et al.  (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011). Unlike our results, Core et al.  (2006), 
studying analyst surprises during the period from January 1991 to December 1999, find that 
firms with poor governance tend to have more positive analyst surprises, although they do not 
find this difference to be statistically significant. Giroud and Mueller (2011), examining the same   27 
period, find, as we do, that analyst surprises (as measured by FE scaled by total assets) are higher 
for Democracy (G) firms; however,  they do not find such a difference to be statistically 
significant.
16  
The analyses of Core et al. (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011) differ from each other as 
well as differ from our analysis in terms of data construction and estimation specification. We 
have therefore conducted an analysis of what drives the differences in results between these two 
papers as well as between each of them and ours, and we provide the results of this reconciliation 
analysis in our online appendix. The analysis indicates that the key reason why both Giroud and 
Mueller and we get positive association between good governance and positive analyst surprises, 
but Core et al. get a negative association, is the use of data filters.  
Unlike Core et al., both Giroud and Mueller and we exclude dual-class firms and firms 
followed by fewer than five analysts. The reason why the positive association between good 
governance and positive analyst surprises is significant in some of our specifications, but not in 
those of Giroud and Mueller, is that they use only the G-Index and we also use the E-Index. 
Recall that our results in Table 7 are statistically significant when we use the E-Index, which 
excludes the “noise” introduced by governance provisions that do not matter.    
In summary, as with market surprises around earnings announcements, the evidence 
discussed in this section is also consistent with the hypothesis that, by the end of 2001, market 
players had internalized the difference between good-governance and poor-governance firms (as 
those firms are defined by the governance indices). 
 
3.5. Operating performance and Tobin’s Q 
Under the learning hypothesis, good governance will continue to be associated with higher 
firm value and better operating performance after the learning period. In particular, the learning 
hypothesis says that good governance will cease to be associated with abnormal returns after the 
end of the learning period simply because the improved performance associated with good 
governance will become factored into market prices. 
                                                 
16 They do find this difference to be statistically significant among the firms in the least competitive industries, 
which are a main focus of their (but not our) paper.      28 
We begin by looking at the relationship between the governance indices and Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q has long been used in the governance literature as a key measure of firm value and 
performance.
17 GIM (2003) report a strong and negative association between the G-Index and 
Tobin’s Q from 1990 to 1999, and BCF (2009) find a strong and negative association between 
the E-Index and Tobin’s Q from 1992 to 2002. Following prior work, we use the definition of 
Tobin’s Q in Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
18 and we use as the dependent variable the log of 
industry-median-adjusted Tobin’s Q, defined as the log of a firm’s Q divided by the industry’s 
median Q, using the Fama-French 48 industry definitions.  
In row 1 of Table 8 Panel A, we report results from pooled regressions of industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q on the governance indices. As controls, we use all the variables used as controls in 
BCF (2009), who in turn used the same controls of GIM (2003) with a few additions:
19 log of the 
book value of assets in the current fiscal year, log of company age measured in months as of 
December of each year, a dummy for incorporation in Delaware, insider ownership, square of 
inside ownership, ROA (the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets at the beginning 
of the fiscal year) in the current fiscal year, CAPEX/assets (the ratio of capital expenditures to 
assets) in the current fiscal year, leverage in the current fiscal year, R&D expenditures per sales 
in the current fiscal year, and dummies for missing R&D expenditure data and missing inside 
ownership data. Data on all these standard controls are taken from Compustat. To account for 
both cross-sectional and time-series correlation in the data, we estimate two-way cluster robust 
standard errors, clustering by year and by firm. We pooled two time periods in our regressions, 
1990–2001 and 2002–2008.  
Our results show that both the G-Index and E-Index are negatively associated with Tobin’s Q 
both  during 1990–2001 and during 2002–2008. Both the magnitudes and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the governance indices remained stable across the two periods. 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Lang and 
Stulz (1994), and LaPorta et al. (2002).  
18 Under this definition, Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets plus 
the market value of common stock less the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet 
deferred taxes. 
19 Using only the controls employed by GIM, with no additions, yields similar results.   29 
In addition to Tobin’s Q, we also examine several operating performance metrics: ROA 
(defined as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year), five-year, three-year, and one-year sales growth (the ratio of total sales in the current 
fiscal year to the total sales of five, three, and one fiscal years ago, respectively), and net profit 
margin (the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to sales in the current fiscal year). As 
with Q, these dependent variables are adjusted by their industry-median values in the same fiscal 
year, using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications.  
Rows 2–6 of Table 8 Panel A report the results of pooled regressions of industry-adjusted 
operating performance measures on governance indices and controls. As controls in each of these 
pooled regressions, we include log of the book-to-market ratio from the previous fiscal year, log 
of total assets, log of company age, an indicator for Delaware incorporation, inside ownership, 
square of inside ownership, CAPEX/assets, and R&D per sales, dummies for missing R&D 
expenditure data and missing inside ownership data, as well as year and industry fixed effects.  
We estimate two-way cluster robust standard errors, clustering by firm and year.  
As with Q, we find in general the association between the governance indices and operating 
performance to be negative and statistically significant both in the period 1990–2001 and also 
2002–2008, with the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on the governance 
index to be stable across the two periods. For net profit margin, we find the association to 
strengthen in the period 2002–2008. Panel B of Table 8 uses Democracy (G) and Democracy (E) 
as the primary independent variables of interest, and yields qualitatively similar results to those 
obtained using the G-Index and E-Index.  
We can thus conclude that, while the association between the governance indices and 
abnormal returns did not exist after the period for which it was identified, the relationship of 
governance indices with Tobin’s Q and firm operating performance measures found by prior 
work persisted throughout our sample period 1990–2008. While the difference between good-
governance and bad-governance firms was no longer a surprise to market participants, it 
remained in place and continued to be reflected in firms’ operating performance and Tobin’s Q. 
This finding also indicates that, even though the G-Index and E-Index can no longer generate 
abnormal trading profits, they remain a valuable tool for researchers, investors, and 
policymakers.  
Of course, the persistent relation between governance indices and the value and performance 
of firms raises causality questions. To what extent is the relationship due to governance   30 
provisions weakening shareholders rights being a cause of worse firm performance and to what 
extent are such provisions merely a signal, reflecting the tendency of firms with poor 
performance to have such provisions? The literature has not been able to resolve fully these 
questions.
20  Because governance provisions are publicly known, however, whether such 
provisions are a causal force or merely a signal, the ability to use information about such 
provisions to generate trading profits requires explaining. Our findings in this paper indicate that 
markets have learned over time to appreciate the differences between firms scoring well and 
poorly according to the governance indices. However, these findings do not resolve the causality 
questions—which the literature has generally been unable to resolve—concerning the extent to 
which governance provisions directly cause or merely signal the worse performance of the firms 
having them.  
 
3.6. Other factor models 
As discussed earlier, an alternative explanation to the learning explanation is that the four-
factor model we employ to estimate abnormal returns is misspecified. An omitted risk factor that 
is positively correlated with the G-  and E-Index can account for the existence of abnormal 
returns in the four-factor model. If an alternative factor model explains asset returns, it must also 
explain the post-2001 disappearance in governance abnormal returns derived from the four-
factor model, which can occur if the risk premium associated with the unobserved and 
confounding risk factors became very small or non-existent during the period 2002–2008.  
To examine the possibility that an alternative pricing model explains the pattern of abnormal 
returns observed in the standard four-factor model, we consider four alternative factor models. In 
each of the four variations we include alternative factors to the regression specification of (1), 
but also include interaction terms with the POST 2001 dummy with each of the factors. For ease 
of presentation, we report in Table 9 only the coefficients on the constant term and POST 2001 
indicator, as well as the p-value on F-test for the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients 
is zero. Panel A of Table 9 reports results for the G-Index trading strategy, and Panel B of Table 
9 reports results for the E-Index trading strategy. Both panels follow the same structure.  
                                                 
20 Works seeking to shed some light on the causality question include GIM (2003), Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005), and Cremers and Ferrell (2010).    31 
In row 1 we consider a four-factor model that uses, instead of the Carhart momentum factor, 
the UMD momentum factor constructed by Fama and French (1996). These two measures are 
similar, but the construction of UMD uses an additional sort based on size. Using the UMD, our 
results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
model, with positive average monthly abnormal returns observed until the end of 2001 and none 
subsequently.  
In rows 2–4 we consider three five-factor models which add to the three Fama-French factors 
and the Carhart momentum factor an additional fifth risk factor. In row 2, we include as the fifth 
risk factor the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), a factor which reflects the level 
of market-wide liquidity in a given month.
  21  The results indicate that the inclusion of the 
liquidity factor  produces results  qualitatively similar to those obtained using the four-factor 
model.  
Row 3 includes as a fifth risk factor the downside risk factor of Ang et al. (2006), a factor 
which reflects the downside movement of the market and which we construct following the 
description in Ang et al. (2006). As the results in row 3 indicate, with the inclusion of the 
downside risk factor, the results remain qualitatively similar to those obtained using the four-
factor model.  
Next, row 4 includes as the fifth risk factor the takeover factor of Cremers et al. (2009), 
which we obtained from these authors.
22 This factor reflects the spread between firms that are 
most likely to be exposed to takeovers and firms that are least likely to be exposed to takeovers. 
Consistent with Cremers et al. (2009) and Giroud and Mueller (2011), we find that the inclusion 
of the takeover factor in general weakens our results using the G-Index portfolios. However, we 
still find that, during the “learning period” of 1990–2001, the GIM value-weighted portfolio 
generated positive excess returns of 47 basis points, which is statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  
                                                 
21 Obtained from the Web site of Lubos Pastor: 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/liq_data_1962_2008.txt. 
22 We are grateful to Martin Cremers for making data available to us. The data on the takeover factor 
provided by the authors range from January 1991 to December of 2003; therefore, all our regressions 
involving the takeover factor only contain 156 months of data, with 24 months in the post 2001-period.    32 
We also find that the POST coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level, and that the sum of the constant and POST results in average abnormal monthly returns for 
the 2002–2008 period is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level. Furthermore, 
the value-weighted E-Index portfolio produces the same patterns in returns as those obtained for 
the  four-factor model, with the results retaining strong statistical significance. Although the 
equal-weighted G-Index and E-Index portfolios do not obtain statistical significance, the constant 
and POST coefficients still have the same sign and similar magnitude to those obtained using the 
four-factor model. Thus, the additional common risk factors thus far put forward in the literature 
cannot fully explain the existence of a governance-returns correlation during 1990–2001 and its 
subsequent disappearance.  
 
3.7. Robustness checks 
Before concluding, we conduct robustness checks with respect to our results concerning the 
differences between the 1990–2001 and 2002–2008 periods in terms of (i) abnormal returns on 
the governance strategies based on the G-Index and E-Index, (ii) how good-governance and 
poor-governance firms differed in the abnormal returns accompanying earnings announcements, 
and (iii) how these two types of firms differed in producing positive analyst surprises. As 
explained below, we find that our results are robust to the three types of tests we conduct.  
First, we examine the robustness of our results to the exclusion of new economy firms.  Core 
et al. (2006) suggest that GIM’s results might have been partly driven by new economy firms. It 
might therefore be asked whether the differences we identify between the two periods are driven 
by the new economy firms, which fared so differently in these two periods. To examine this 
possibility, we repeat all of our tests after excluding new economy firms. We use the 
classification of new economy firms used by Murphy (2003) (who in turn followed the approach 
of Anderson et al. (2000)). In untabulated results, we also repeat all our tests excluding new 
economy firms as classified by Hand (2003) (a classification which excludes fewer firms), and 
obtain similar results.  
Second, we examine the robustness of our results to the exclusion of firms in competitive 
industries. Giroud and Mueller (2011) report that GIM’s results were driven by firms in non-
competitive industries, where the lack of product market competition makes internal governance 
especially important. Accordingly, it might be asked whether the differences between the 1990–
2001 and 2002–2008 periods that we identify continue to hold when one focuses solely on firms   33 
in non-competitive industries. In examining this question, we follow Giroud and Mueller (2011). 
In particular, we use the 48 industry classifications of Fama and French (1997), and we compute, 
for each firm in each fiscal year and industry, the Herfindahl index, defined to be the sum of 





Nk ∑ ,  (5) 
where sikt is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t, and market shares are defined using 
sales. The computation of HHI requires the entire Compustat universe; however, in our tests we 
compute HHI medians in a given point in time among firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship 
portfolios, respectively. That is, in a given point in time we divide the Democracy and 
Dictatorship portfolios into two equal-sized portfolios based on HHI median. To test whether our 
results hold for the firms in the least competitive firms, we remove the lowest half of firms from 
the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios, respectively, and repeat our tests.  
Third, we examine the robustness of our results concerning the differences in abnormal 
returns between the 1990–2001 and 2002–2008 periods to industry adjustments to control for the 
possibility of industry-level clustering in stock returns. Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009) 
argue that industry effects may drive governance alphas, and Lewellen and Metrick (2010) 
develop a methodology of adjusting  for industry effects in returns that display strong 
econometric properties. Following Lewellen and Metrick (2010), we adjust for the returns of 
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That is, the return for a firm i (from the Democracy or Dictatorship portfolios) from t-1 to t is 
adjusted by the weighted-average return from the set of all firms J from CRSP which share the 
same industry classification as i. We use beginning-of-month market capitalization as weights 
and, consistent with  our earlier results, continue to use the  Fama-French 48 industry 
classification. After adjusting for industry effects in this way, we compute the value- and equal-
weighted G-Index and E-Index portfolios by using industry-adjusted returns in place of raw 
stock returns.   
Table 10 displays the results of the three types of robustness tests that we conduct. Panel A of 
Table 10 reports the results of robustness tests for our results on abnormal returns to governance   34 
strategies (see Table 4). We find that, after excluding new economy firms, excluding firms in 
more competitive industries, and adjusting for industry effects, we still obtain consistent and 
persistent evidence that after 2001, there is a statistically and economically significant decline in 
the abnormal returns generated by trading on the governance indices. For each of the three cuts 
of the data—excluding new economy firms, excluding the lower half of HHI firms among the 
Democracy and Dictatorship portfolio firms, respectively, and adjusting for industry returns—we 
consider abnormal returns from going long (short) on Democracy (Dictatorship) firms, defined 
by E and G, both using market-value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios. Altogether, we 
conduct in this way a total of 3x2x2 = 12 robustness tests. In 11 of the 12 tests of Panel A, we 
find statistically significant average monthly abnormal returns from 1990 to 2001. Moreover, in 
all the 12 tests of Panel A, F-tests indicate that after 2001,  average abnormal returns are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Panel B of Table 10 displays the results of robustness tests for our results relating earnings 
announcement returns to governance indices (see Table 6). While we report only results from a 
window of five trading days prior to until one day after the earnings announcement date, we also 
conduct robustness tests using all other windows considered in Tables 5 and 6 and obtain similar 
results. For each of the two cuts of data—excluding new economy firms, and excluding the 
lower half of HHI firms among the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolio firms, respectively—
we conduct tests using Democracy (Dictatorship) definitions based on G and E, and we consider 
raw returns as well as returns in excess of the Fama-French three factors. Thus, we conduct a 
total of 2x2x2 = 8 robustness tests. All eight robustness tests in Panel B of Table 10 indicate that 
the market is more positively surprised by good-governance firms than bad-governance firms 
during the period 1990–2001. Moreover, in all eight tests we find that, during the 2002–2008 
period, there is no statistically significant difference in the market’s reaction around earnings 
announcements of good-governance versus bad-governance firms.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 10  conducts robustness tests for our results relating analyst 
surprises to governance indices (see Table 7). Here, we rerun the pooled median regressions of 
Table 7 for each of two cuts of the data—excluding new economy firms, and excluding the lower 
half of HHI firms among the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolio firms, respectively. Because 
we rerun the regressions using Democracy (Dictatorship) firms based on either G or E 
definitions, as well as use the four analyst surprise variables (FE scaled by price, FE scaled by 
assets, SUE, and FE(%)) used in Table 7, we run a total of 2x2x4 = 16 robustness tests. In 12 of   35 
the 16 tests, we find that analysts are more likely to be positively surprised by good-governance 
firms during the period 1990–2001, with eight of the 16 tests showing statistical significance at 
the 5% level. In contrast, for the 2002–2008 period, this relationship no longer holds in 13 of the 
16 robustness tests. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to help resolve the questions arising from the  well-known and 
intriguing finding of an association between and abnormal returns during the 1990s and the G-
Index and E-index governance indices. After showing that the association ceased to exist during 
the 2000s, we provided evidence that can help explain both the existence of the association 
during the 1990s and its subsequent disappearance. In particular, our analysis provides evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that both the existence and disappearance of the governance-
returns correlation were due to market participants’ learning during the 1990s to appreciate the 
difference between firms scoring well and poorly on the governance indices.  
Consistent with the learning hypothesis, we find that (i) the disappearance of the governance-
return correlation was associated with an increase in the attention to governance by a wide range 
of market participants; (ii) the structural break in the returns to governance strategies 
corresponded to the timing of the sharp rise in the attention to governance; (iii) until the 
beginning of the 2000s, but not subsequently, stock market reactions to earnings announcements 
reflected the market being more positively surprised by the earnings announcements of good-
governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms; (iv) analysts were also more 
positively surprised by the earnings announcements of good-governance firms than by those of 
poor-governance firms until the beginning of the 2000s but not afterwards; (v) while the G and E 
indices could no longer generate abnormal returns in the 2000s, their negative association with 
Tobin’s  Q  and operating performance persisted; and (vi) the existence and subsequent 
disappearance of the governance-return correlation cannot be explained by any of the factors that 
have been suggested in the literature for augmenting the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. 
Our results are robust to excluding new economy firms, excluding firms in non-competitive 
industries, and adjusting for industry returns.  
By explaining both the presence during the 1990s and the subsequent disappearance of a 
correlation between returns and the governance indices, our findings resolve a puzzle posed by 
the existing literature, However, by showing that the governance indices remain associated with   36 
firm value and operating performance notwithstanding the disappearance of their correlation 
with returns, our work indicates that these indices continue to offer a potentially effective tool for 
researchers and market participants. We hope that our findings will be useful to subsequent work 
on corporate governance and on learning in capital markets. R-1 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative excess returns from governance strategies 1990–2008. 
Figure 1 plots by month the cumulative excess returns from governance trading strategies. G-Index trading strategy involves, on a monthly basis, going 
long the portfolio of Democracy (G) firms, defined as those firms with G-Index values of 5 or lower, and simultaneously shorting a portfolio of 
Dictatorship (G) firms, defined as those firms with G-Index values of 14 or higher. E-Index trading strategy involves, on a monthly basis, going long the 
portfolio of Democracy (E) firms, defined as those firms with E-Index values of zero, and simultaneously shorting a portfolio of Dictatorship (E) firms, 
defined as those firms with E-Index values of 5 or higher.  We consider both value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) portfolios, weighting by 
beginning-of-month market capitalization. Cumulative trading strategy excess returns are estimated as follows. At the beginning of each month, we 
estimate over the next 36 months average monthly abnormal returns using the standard four factor model based on the three factors of Fama-French (1993) 
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Fig. 2.  Attention to governance from the media, institutional investors, and researchers. 
 
Fig. 2(A) plots by year the number of unique newspaper articles, news wires, publications, and articles in four major newspapers (USA Today, New York 
Times, Washington Post, and Financial Times) that reference the words “Corporate Governance,” normalized by 1990 base period counts. The data are 
obtained from Lexis-Nexis Academic. Fig. 2(B) reports the number of shareholder proposals submitted by institutional investors in each year, normalized 
by 1990 base period counts. Fig. 2(C) plots in solid line the number of new governance-related working papers that are posted on the NBER working 
paper database, and in dotted line the number of new governance-related working papers posted in the NBER working paper database normalized by the 
total number of new papers in the NBER working paper database over the same year. Fig. 2(D) plots the monthly value of the attention index, constructed 
as follows:  for each one of the attention measures, we estimate for each month the 12-month rolling average, normalize it by the 1990 value of this 
measure, and then take the arithmetic average across the three measures to get the monthly value of the attention index.  
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(C): NBER working papers on corporate governance 
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Table 1 
Governance and returns—summary statistics 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the data used in the empirical analyses of this paper. Panel A reports summary statistics on governance indices, as 
measured by the G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) and the E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), for each of the eight years in which 
IRRC volumes were published.  Democracy (G) refers to firms with G-Index values less than or equal to 5, while Democracy (E) refers to firms with E-
Index values of 0; Dictatorship (G) refers to firms with G-Index values greater than or equal to 14, while Dictatorship (E) refers to firms with E-Index 
values greater than or equal to 5. Panel B reports the average monthly returns of value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) governance portfolios, 
which are long Democracy portfolios and short Dictatorship portfolios, for G and E, respectively, in the period between publications of IRRC volumes.  
Panel A: Governance indices
1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
G-Index 9.1209 9.3833 9.4316 8.9248 9.1672 9.2269 9.2640 9.1936
(2.850) (2.831) (2.789) (2.842) (2.706) (2.607) (2.554) (2.527)
E-Index 2.2807 2.3487 2.3203 2.2717 2.4187 2.4897 2.5425 2.4957
(1.386) (1.352) (1.343) (1.344) (1.331) (1.300) (1.260) (1.244)
Democracy (G) 10.19% 9.89% 8.84% 12.47% 9.20% 7.17% 7.12% 6.45%
Dictatorship (G) 6.09% 6.72% 6.27% 5.01% 5.44% 5.57% 4.99% 4.54%
Democracy (E) 12.29% 10.57% 10.84% 11.04% 8.59% 7.50% 6.18% 5.27%
Dictatorship (E) 4.40% 4.51% 3.71% 3.66% 4.37% 4.84% 4.56% 3.88%
Observations 1,001 1,041 1,052 1,476 1,304 1,507 1,602 1,519
Panel B: Governance indices portfolios and average raw returns
1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
9/90–6/93 7/93~6/95 7/95–1/98 2/98–1/00 2/00–1/02 2/02–12/03 2/04–12/05 1/06–6/08
VW:  Democracy (G)–Dictatorship (G) -0.065% 0.273% 0.019% 1.369% -0.767% -0.491% -0.403% -0.112%
EW:  Democracy (G)–Dictatorship (G) 0.196% 0.114% -0.275% 0.778% -0.081% 0.008% 0.055% -0.164%
VW:  Democracy (E)–Dictatorship (E) 0.084% 0.277% 0.273% 1.382% -0.952% -0.588% -0.301% 0.012%
EW:  Democracy (E)–Dictatorship (E) 0.003% 0.235% -0.056% 0.972% -0.275% -0.218% -0.038% 0.058%    T-2 
Table 2 
Governance indices and abnormal stock returns 
Table 2 reports a subperiod breakdown of governance portfolio monthly alphas, estimated using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and includes 
the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, for two sets of governance portfolios. The first portfolio is long stocks in the Democracy (G) portfolio (G-Index < 
5) and short stocks in the Dictatorship (G) portfolio (G-Index > 14); the second portfolio is long stocks in the Democracy (E) portfolio (E-Index = 0) and 
short stocks in the Dictatorship (E) portfolio (E-Index > 5). We consider portfolios both value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) by firms’ 
common stock market capitalization. Firms’ entrenchment scores were adjusted when updated information on firms’ corporate governance provisions 
became available: July 1993; July 1995; February 1998; February 2000; February 2002; January 2004; and January 2006. All standard errors are White 
(1980) robust and reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Periods
VW EW VW EW
a 0.0069 *** 0.0049 ** 0.0123 *** 0.0060 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
b -0.0030 0.0022 0.0026 0.0035
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1990–2008 0.0018 0.0032 ** 0.0069 *** 0.0041 **
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
a: Sample period begins in September of 1990
b: Sample period ends in June of 2008
1990–1999            
2000–2008            
                                                          
Democracy (E) - Dictatorship (E)
                                                                
Democracy (G) - Dictatorship (G)  T-3 
Table 3 
Governance alphas and attention to governance 
Panel A reports a regression of governance portfolio hedge returns on the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, as 
well as a quintile-ranked attention to corporate governance index and interactions between the four factors and the quintile-ranked index. The monthly 
values of the attention index are calculated as indicated in the description of Fig. 2. Only the constant term and the coefficients on the quintile-ranked 
attention index are reported. Columns 1 and 2 consider the value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) portfolios, respectively, formed on the G-
Index: long stocks in the Democracy (G) portfolio (G-Index < 5) and short stocks in the Dictatorship (G) portfolio (G-Index > 14); columns 3 and 4 
consider the value- and equal-weighted portfolios, respectively, based on the E-Index: long stocks in the Democracy (E) portfolio (E-Index = 0) and short 
stocks in the Dictatorship (E) portfolio  (E-Index  >  5). VW portfolios are weighted based on firms’ beginning-of-month common stock market 
capitalization, and weights are rebalanced monthly. Firms’ entrenchment scores were adjusted when updated information on firms’ corporate governance 
provisions became available: July 1993; July 1995; February 1998; February 2000; February 2002; January 2004; and January 2006. Standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. Panel B reports a regression of rolling 36-month alphas on the 
quintile-ranked attention index. Rolling 36-month alphas are estimated, for each month, using portfolio returns and four factors over the current and 
previous 35 months. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust, using the Newey-West (1987) estimator with 36 lags. Throughout, 
levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Governance portfolio returns and attention to corporate governance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable VW EW VW EW
Alpha 0.0070** 0.0051** 0.0140*** 0.0052**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Quintile of attention index -0.0023** -0.0009 -0.0032*** -0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 210 210 210 210
Panel B: Rolling 36-month alphas and attention to corporate governance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable VW EW VW EW
Alpha 0.0071*** 0.0036*** 0.0114*** 0.0059***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Quintile of attention index -0.0018** -0.0003 -0.0022* -0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 179 179 179 179
  Democracy (G) - 
Dictatorship(G)
  Democracy (G) - 
Dictatorship(G)
  Democracy (E) - 
Dictatorship(E)
  Democracy (E) - 
Dictatorship(E)
 
   T-4 
Table 4 
Structural break in the governance-returns association 
Panel A reports the structural break points in governance excess returns from two methodologies, first using the Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) statistic 
and second using a 36-month rolling regression approach. Panel B reports the difference in governance hedge portfolio monthly alphas before (and 
including) 2001 and post-2001 for four governance portfolios,  using governance portfolio returns from September of 1990 to December of 2009. 
Governance portfolios are defined as described in Table 2. Monthly alphas are estimated using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and include the 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor. We include a post- (and not including) 2001 dummy (POST) to test for changes in governance portfolios’ average 
monthly alphas. The factors and interactions of factors with the post-2001 dummy are suppressed for ease of presentation. All standard errors are White 
(1980) robust and errors appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Identifying structural break
VW G-Index EW G-Index VW E-Index EW E-Index
QLR statistic May-00 September-01 August-00 December-00
Rolling alpha March-02 December-02 January-03 July-02
Midpoint March-01 April-02 October-01 September-01
Panel B: Rolling 36-month alphas and attention to corporate governance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable VW EW VW EW
ALPHA 0.0057** 0.0049*** 0.0111*** 0.0054***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
POST2002 -0.0092** -0.0029 -0.0113*** -0.0014
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 214 214 214 214
Adj. Rsq 0.3586 0.5581 0.4774 0.4843
F-stat 1.55 0.84 0.01 2.95
p-Val 0.21 0.36 0.94 0.09
Democracy (G) - Dictatorship (G)      Democracy (E) - Dictatorship (E)  T-5 
Table 5 
Earnings announcement returns and governance indices 
 
Table 5 reports the relationship between earnings announcement returns and corporate governance indices in the period before and after the end 
of 2001, where the announcement return windows range from 1, 3, 5, 10, and 20 trading days prior to the earnings announcement date until 1 
trading day after the announcement. We define a post- (and not including) 2001 dummy to indicate the earnings announcement occurred in 
calendar year 2002 or later. Panel A reports coefficients from an OLS regression of the announcement returns in a particular window on the 
G-Index, the POST dummy, and an interaction of the two terms; Panel B is identical to Panel A but uses the E-Index instead. Each panel is 
divided into two parts; the left-hand side panel uses raw stock returns around the announcement window as the dependent variable, whereas the 
right-hand side panel’s specifications use returns in excess of the Fama-French (1993) three factors over the relevant time window, using betas 
estimated from 20 to 210 trading days prior to the earnings announcement. In addition to REITs and dual-class firms (following Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick, 2003), firms followed by fewer than five analysts (following Giroud and Mueller, 2011) are excluded from the analysis. Two-way 
cluster robust standard errors are used throughout, clustering by firm and year-quarter, and appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in 
parentheses. F-statistics and p-values testing the null hypothesis of no relation between earnings announcement returns and governance in the 
post-2001 period (β1+β3=0) are reported in the last two rows of each panel. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: G-Index
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1) (T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1)
G-Index (β 1) -0.0003 -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0011*** -0.0014*** -0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
POST2002 (β 2) -0.007 -0.0119** -0.0171** -0.0215** -0.0295**  -0.0048 -0.0065* -0.0086** -0.0110** -0.0175***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
G-Index  x  POST (β 3) 0.0005 0.0007** 0.0010*** 0.0011* 0.0016**  0.0004 0.0005* 0.0007** 0.0010** 0.0015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 63,193 63,192 63,192 63,192 63,191 63,179 63,178 63,178 63,178 63,177
Adj. Rsq                                                                                                     0.0004 0.0011 0.0020 0.0031 0.0035 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006
F-stat (β 1+β 3 = 0) 0.4208 0.2617 0.2160 0.0010 0.1623 0.5006 0.0269 0.0269 0.0023 0.3400
p-Val 0.5165 0.6089 0.6421 0.9746 0.6870 0.4792 0.8697 0.8698 0.9615 0.5598
Panel B: E-Index
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1) (T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1)
E-Index (β 1) -0.0006** -0.0011*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0022*** -0.0004* -0.0008*** -0.0014*** -0.0019*** -0.0025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
POST2002 (β 2) -0.0058* -0.0090** -0.0128** -0.0168** -0.0226**  -0.0042** -0.0048** -0.0060** -0.0071** -0.0109***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
E-Index  x  POST (β 3) 0.0013** 0.0017** 0.0023*** 0.0023** 0.0033**  0.0011** 0.0012** 0.0018*** 0.0023** 0.0032***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 63,193 63,192 63,192 63,192 63,191 63,179 63,178 63,178 63,178 63,177
Adj. Rsq                                                                                                     0.0004 0.0011 0.0020 0.0030 0.0034 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006
F-stat (β 1+β 3 = 0) 1.6479 1.1110 0.7758 0.1855 0.9786 1.8912 0.7457 0.5344 0.2746 0.7502
p-Val 0.1992 0.2919 0.3784 0.6667 0.3225 0.1691 0.3879 0.4648 0.6002 0.3864
Raw returns Excess returns
Raw returns Excess returns
   T-6 
Table 6 
Earnings announcement returns: Democracy vs. dictatorship firms 
 
Table 6 reports the relationship between earnings announcement returns and democracy/dictatorship firms in the period before and after the end 
of 2001, where the announcement return windows range from 1, 3, 5, 10, and 20 trading days prior to the earnings announcement date until 1 
trading day after the announcement. We define a post- (and not including) 2001 dummy to indicate the earnings announcement occurred in 
calendar year 2002 or later. Panel A reports coefficients from an OLS regression of the announcement returns in a particular window on a 
democracy portfolio dummy (where DEMOCRACY (G) = 1 if G < 5 and DEMOCRACY (G) = 0 if G > 14), a post-2001 period dummy, and an 
interaction of the two terms; Panel B is identical to Panel A but uses the E-Index to define the democracy portfolio dummy (where 
DEMOCRACY (E) = 1 if E = 0 and DEMOCRACY (E) = 9 if E > 5).  Each panel is divided into two parts; the left-hand side panel uses raw 
stock returns around the announcement window as the dependent variable, whereas the right hand side panel’s specifications use returns in excess 
of the Fama-French (1993) three factors over the relevant time window, using betas estimated from 20 to 210 trading days prior to the earnings 
announcement. In addition to REITs and dual-class firms (following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003), firms followed by fewer than five 
analysts (following Giroud and Mueller, 2011) are excluded from the analysis. Two-way cluster robust standard errors are used throughout, 
clustering by firm and year-quarter, and appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. F-statistics and p-values testing the 
null hypothesis of no relation between earnings announcement returns and governance in the post-2001 period (β1+β3=0) are reported in the last 
two rows of each panel. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: G-Index
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1) (T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1)
DEMOCRACY (G)  (β 1) 0.0026 0.0061** 0.0090*** 0.0106*** 0.0121**  0.0017 0.0048* 0.0069** 0.0100*** 0.0115***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
POST2002 (β 2) -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0030 -0.0064 -0.0092 -0.0022 -0.0010 0.0007 0.0030 0.0030
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
DEMOCRACY (G)  x  POST  (β 3) -0.0042 -0.0077* -0.0114*** -0.0135** -0.0176*** -0.0031 -0.0055 -0.0077* -0.0121** -0.0163***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 8,413 8,413 8,413 8,413 8,413 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408
Adj. Rsq 0.0013 0.0027 0.0038 0.0052 0.0062 0.0005 0.0009 0.0012 0.0017 0.0020
F-stat (β 1+β 3 = 0) 0.2940 0.2813 0.4890 0.4139 1.2397 0.2253 0.0663 0.0481 0.2046 0.9478
p-Val 0.5877 0.5959 0.4844 0.5200 0.2656 0.6350 0.7968 0.8263 0.6510 0.3303
Panel B: E-Index
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1) (T-1,T+1) (T-3,T+1) (T-5,T+1) (T-10,T+1) (T-20,T+1)
DEMOCRACY (E)  (β 1) 0.0046*** 0.0068*** 0.0105*** 0.0103*** 0.0102**  0.0034** 0.0060*** 0.0096*** 0.0108*** 0.0132***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
POST2002 (β 2) -0.0006 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0066 -0.0095 -0.0001 0.0011 0.0043 0.0034 0.0035
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
DEMOCRACY (E)  x  POST  (β 3) -0.0074** -0.0103** -0.0142*** -0.0130* -0.0200*** -0.0066** -0.0080** -0.0113*** -0.0138** -0.0206***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022
Adj. Rsq 0.0016 0.0027 0.0041 0.0054 0.0078 0.0010 0.0012 0.0018 0.0022 0.0035
F-stat (β 1+β 3 = 0) 0.8621 0.9093 0.6715 0.1681 2.5792 1.3104 0.3982 0.1834 0.3598 2.0314
p-Val 0.3532 0.3403 0.4126 0.6818 0.1083 0.2523 0.5280 0.6685 0.5486 0.1541
Raw returns Excess returns
Raw returns Excess returns
   T-7 
Table 7 
Analyst surprises and governance indices 
Table 7 reports coefficients from pooled quantile regressions of analyst surprise on corporate governance measures in the period before and after 
the end of 2001. We define a post- (and not including) 2001 dummy to indicate the earnings announcement occurred in calendar year 2002 or 
later. Four measures of surprise are used as dependent variables: forecast error scaled by price measured at the forecast date (FE scaled by price); 
forecast error scaled by total assets per share from the previous quarter end (FE scaled by assets); forecast error scaled by the standard deviation 
of analyst forecasts (SUE); forecast error scaled by the mean analyst forecast (FE %). Forecast error is defined as the I/B/E/S actual quarterly 
earnings per share (EPS) minus the mean analyst forecast measured on the date closest to but prior to the announcement date. Four governance 
measures are considered: Panel A uses the G-Index  in  columns 1–4 and the  E-Index  in  columns 5–8; Panel B uses  an indicator for 
democracy/dictatorship using the G-Index (where DEMO (G) = 1 if G-Index < 5 and DEMO (G) = 0 if G-Index > 14) in columns 1–4, and an 
indicator for democracy/dictatorship using the E-Index (where DEMO (E) = 1 if E-Index = 0 and DEMO (E) = 1 if E-Index > 5) in columns 5–8. 
We control for the log of market capitalization and the log of the book-to-market ratio, but have suppressed the coefficients in the table. In 
addition to REITs and dual-class firms (following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), firms followed by fewer than five analysts (following 
Giroud and Mueller, 2011) are excluded from the analysis. Two-way cluster robust standard errors are used throughout, clustering by firm and 
year-quarter, and appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. F-statistics and p-values testing the null hypothesis of no 
relation between analyst surprise and governance in the post-2001 period (β1+β3=0) are reported in the last two rows of each panel. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 








by assets SUE FE (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables G-Index G-Index G-Index G-Index E-Index E-Index E-Index E-Index
Gov. var (β 1) -0.0002 -0.0005 -1.2198 -0.0375 -0.0034 ** -0.0025 ** -4.5251 *** -0.2332 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.954) (0.051) (0.002) (0.001) (1.635) (0.078)
Post (β 2) 0.0225 * 0.0481 *** 57.0660 *** 2.3103 *** 0.0179 ** 0.0330 *** 52.9640 *** 1.6530 ***
(0.012) (0.011) (17.922) (0.817) (0.008) (0.007) (13.263) (0.491)
Gov. var X Post (β 3) 0.0004 -0.0019 ** 0.3556 -0.0285 0.0044 *** -0.0011 3.5154 * 0.1902 *
(0.001) (0.001) (1.113) (0.063) (0.002) (0.002) (2.339) (0.108)
Log(market cap) -0.0017 -0.0037 ** 3.4094 ** -0.1299 -0.0017 -0.0043 ** 2.7336 -0.1632
(0.002) (0.002) (1.577) (0.105) (0.001) (0.002) (1.296) (0.115)
Log(book-to-market) -0.0093 -0.0593 *** -54.2112 *** -2.2616 *** -0.0078 -0.0599 *** -54.4252 *** -2.1860 ***
(0.013) (0.015) (13.182) (0.729) (0.012) (0.018) (14.644) (0.635)
Cons (β 0) 0.0328 0.0681 *** 28.4566 3.1743 ** 0.0366 ** 0.0740 *** 32.9790 ** 3.5767 **
(0.021) (0.022) (22.836) (1.582) (0.018) (0.024) (17.755) (1.398)
Obs 62,464 62,464 59,043 62,171 62,464 62,464 59,043 62,171
Adj. Rsq 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006
F-stat (β 1+β 3 = 0) 0.146 11.661 1.591 2.509 0.933 4.443 0.333 0.200
p-Val 0.703 0.001 0.207 0.113 0.334 0.035 0.564 0.655    T-8 








by assets SUE FE (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables DEMO(G) DEMO(G) DEMO(G) DEMO(G) DEMO(E) DEMO(E) DEMO(E) DEMO(E)
Gov. var (β 1) -0.0025 0.0011 -2.7652 -0.0693 0.0160 ** 0.0145 ** 26.3055 ** 0.9908 **
(0.006) (0.005) (11.634) (0.601) (0.008) (0.006) (10.824) (0.430)
Post (β 2) 0.0169 0.0107 37.0420 ** 1.2591 * 0.0417 *** 0.0219 *** 60.6607 *** 2.3384 ***
(0.013) (0.009) (18.629) (0.733) (0.008) (0.007) (18.902) (0.634)
Gov. var X Post (β 3) -0.0045 0.0059 4.7093 0.1215 -0.0292 *** -0.0030 -29.1201 ** -1.2992 **
(0.010) (0.012) (22.348) (0.891) (0.010) (0.012) (22.099) (0.662)
Log(market cap) -0.0035 * -0.0052 * -2.5501 -0.2921 -0.0008 -0.0031 4.6804 -0.1003
(0.002) (0.003) (4.517) (0.196) (0.001) (0.003) (2.318) (0.145)
Log(book-to-market) 0.0056 -0.0509 *** -80.3010 *** -2.2728 * -0.0112 -0.0753 *** -65.4090 *** -3.3174 ***
(0.026) (0.018) (27.758) (1.334) (0.020) (0.021) (28.181) (1.202)
Cons (β 0) 0.0480 ** 0.0717 ** 80.4627 * 4.3789 ** 0.0114 0.0585 ** -0.7425 * 2.3607 *
(0.021) (0.030) (42.775) (1.904) (0.014) (0.027) (27.356) (1.296)
Obs 8,323 8,323 7,763 8,271 7,948 7,948 7,429 7,923
Adj. Rsq 0.016 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.000
F-stat (β 1+β 3 = 0) 0.876 0.506 0.011 0.005 2.058 1.299 0.016 0.189
p-Val 0.349 0.477 0.917 0.943 0.151 0.255 0.900 0.664
Table 8 
Governance, firm value, operating performance 1990–2008 
Table 8 reports pooled OLS estimation results of Q and operating performance measures on measures of corporate governance (G-Index and 
E-Index in Panel A, Democracy (G) and Democracy (E) in Panel B) and controls on two separate subperiods: 1990–2001 and 2002–2008. Each 
cell in the table represents the coefficient on the respective governance variable in the respective subperiod. Row 1 uses as the dependent variable 
log of Tobin’s Q, defined to be the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as 
book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. We 
use as controls in the Q regressions log of the book value of assets in the current fiscal year, log of company age measured in months as of 
December of each year, a dummy for incorporation in Delaware, insider ownership, square of inside ownership, ROA in the current fiscal year, 
CAPEX/assets in the current fiscal year, leverage in the current fiscal year, and R&D per sales in the current fiscal year. Insider ownership is 
equal to the fraction of shares held by officers and directors. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. CAPEX/assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. R&D per sales is the ratio of research and development expenditures to 
total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus debt due in one year to assets. We also include dummies for missing R&D expenditure 
data and missing inside ownership data. Rows 2–6 consider several operating performance measures as dependent variables in the pooled OLS 
estimation; 2 uses ROA, defined as above; 3–5 use the 5-year, 3-year, and 1-year sales growth, respectively; finally, 6 uses net profit margin 
(NPM), defined as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to sales in the current fiscal year. We use as controls for the regressions in 
2–6 log of the book-to-market ratio from the previous fiscal year, log of total assets, log of company age, an indicator for Delaware incorporation, 
inside ownership, square of inside ownership,  CAPEX/assets, and R&D per sales. Again, we include dummies for missing R&D expenditure 
data and missing inside ownership data as well as year and industry fixed effects. All dependent variables are industry-median-adjusted, 
according to the Fama-French 48 industry definitions, and all regressions include FF48 industry and year fixed effects. Two-way cluster robust 
standard errors are used throughout, clustering by firm and year, and appear immediately below the coefficient estimate in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Panel A: G-Index and E-Index
1990–2001 2002–2008 1990–2001 2002–2008
1) Q -0.0076** -0.0057** -0.0255*** -0.0247***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
2) ROA -0.0014** -0.0019*** -0.0026* -0.0036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3) 5-Yr sales growth -0.0642*** -0.0220* -0.1164*** -0.0866**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.028) (0.034)
4) 3-Yr sales growth -0.0156*** -0.0106*** -0.0302*** -0.0219**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
5) 1-Yr sales growth -0.0021* -0.0023* -0.0047* -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
6) NPM -0.0009 -0.0015** -0.0011 -0.0031**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
G-Index E-Index
 
Panel B: Democracy (G) and Democracy (E) 
1990–2001 2002–2008 1990–2001 2002–2008
1) Q 0.0393 0.1904*** 0.1003*** 0.1341***
(0.031) (0.041) (0.036) (0.044)
2) ROA 0.0241*** 0.0199* 0.009 0.0386***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
3) 5-Yr sales growth 0.5323*** 0.5295*** 0.6159** 0.9458***
(0.163) (0.169) (0.248) (0.263)
4) 3-Yr sales growth 0.1223** 0.1733*** 0.1723** 0.2496***
(0.054) (0.060) (0.082) (0.061)
5) 1-Yr sales growth 0.0271* 0.0294* 0.019 0.0286***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.007)
6) NPM 0.0190*** 0.0181** 0.005 0.0355***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Democracy (G) Democracy (E)
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Table 9 
Additional common risk models 
 
Table 9 reports alternatives to the FF three factors + Carhart momentum factor model estimated in Table 3(B), fully interacted with a post-2001 
indicator variable. Panel A (B) reports results using G-Index (E-Index) strategy portfolios, and each panel follows the same structure. Row 1 
replaces the Carhart momentum factor with the Fama-French UMD factor. Rows 2–4 add on to the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor an additional fifth factor: 2 adds the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); 3 adds the downside risk 
factor of Ang, Chang and Xing (2006); 4 adds the takeover factor of Cremers, Nair, and John (2009). 5 and 6 consider five- and six-factor models 
by adding to the FF three factors and the Carhart momentum factor combinations of factors from 2–4. Data on takeover factor returns end at the 
end of 2003 and therefore, all estimations involving the takeover factor only contain data from September 1990 to December 2003. White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used throughout, and p-values for the F-tests (Cons + Post = 0) are reported in italics.  Levels of significance are 
indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: G-Index
Cons Post p-Val of F-stat Cons Post p-Val of F-stat
1) Use FF UMD factor 0.0045* -0.0076** 0.27 0.0043* -0.0099*** 0.59
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
2) Liquidity factor 0.0056** -0.0085** 0.35 0.0048** -0.0041 0.75
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
3) Downside risk factor 0.0101*** -0.0108** 0.84 0.0040 -0.0039 0.96
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
4) Takeover factor 0.0047* -0.0106* 0.28 0.0022 -0.0042 0.65
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Panel B: E-Index
Cons Post p-Val of F-stat Cons Post p-Val of F-stat
1) Use FF UMD factor 0.0099*** -0.0016 1.00 0.0047** -0.0030 0.21
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
2) Liquidity factor 0.0115***-0.0121*** 0.78 0.0057*** -0.0023 0.16
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
3) Downside risk factor 0.0122*** -0.0116** 0.87 0.0048* 0.0005 0.15
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
4) Takeover factor 0.0118*** -0.0107** 0.78 0.0017 -0.0057 0.35
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Democracy (G) - Dictatorship (G)
Democracy (E) - Dictatorship (E)
VW EW
VW EW




Table 10 reports robustness checks for Tables 4 (Panel B), 6 (columns 3 and 8), and 7 (columns 5–8) in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. In each 
panel, we replicate the estimation in the respective tables but in subsample; in particular, we 1) exclude “new economy” firms as classified by 
Murphy (2003), and 2) exclude the one-third most competitive firms (i.e., firms that lie in the lowest tercile of HHI) in the Democracy portfolio 
as well as the one-third most competitive firms in the Dictatorship portfolio. In each robustness test, we report the key coefficients and report 
standard errors in parentheses below the coefficients. In each specification, we report F-statistics that test the null hypothesis that the post-period 
effect of governance on abnormal returns (Panel A), earnings announcement period returns (Panel B), and analyst surprises around earnings 
announcements (Panel C) is zero; p-values for the F-tests are reported in italics below the F-statistics.  Levels of significance are indicated by *, 
**, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 










1) Excluding new economy firms 0.0055** -0.0111*** 0.07 0.0045** -0.0032 0.55 0.0108*** -0.0114*** 0.80 0.0046** -0.0019 0.22
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
2) Excluding firms from top 1/3 0.0067** -0.0102** 0.34 0.0064*** -0.0036 0.26 0.0139*** -0.0154*** 0.52 0.0062** -0.0026 0.25
    of most competitive industries (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
2) Adjusting for industry 0.0040*   -0.0053  0.60 0.0033** -0.0012  0.27 0.0060*** -0.0056** 0.85 0.0025   0.0007  0.61
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
EW
Democracy (E) - Dictatorship (E) Democracy (G) - Dictatorship (G)
VW EW VW
 










1) Excluding new economy firms 0.0080*** -0.0107**  0.48 0.0060**  -0.0071*   0.75 0.0091*** -0.0127*** 0.35 0.0085*** -0.0098**  0.68
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
2) Excluding firms from top 1/3 0.0118*** -0.0155*** 0.40 0.0092*** -0.0117**  0.52 0.0114*** -0.0158*** 0.30 0.0099*** -0.0134*** 0.38
    of most competitive industries (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Democracy (G) vs. Dictatorship (G) Democracy (E) vs. Dictatorship (E)
Excess returns (T-5,T+1) Raw returns (T-5,T+1) Excess returns (T-5,T+1) Raw returns (T-5,T+1)
 










1) Excluding new economy firms -0.0057 -0.0037 0.31 -0.0007 0.0029 0.85 0.01678** -0.0308*** 0.12 0.0125** -0.0061 0.57
(0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013)
2) Excluding firms from top 1/3 0.0085 -0.0283** 0.04 0.0134 -0.0201 0.66 0.0189** -0.0394*** 0.03 0.0222*** -0.0224 0.99










1) Excluding new economy firms -0.6224 0.5743 0.79 -0.3426 -0.0445 0.62 27.7467*** -30.2197 0.90 1.0187*** -1.4507** 0.51
(11.601) (24.111) (0.661) (0.878) (8.685) (20.351) (0.494) (0.762)
2) Excluding firms from top 1/3 15.0151 -41.7731* 0.09 0.5539 -1.5200 0.27 28.4450*** -46.8143*** 0.19 1.4152*** -2.2849*** 0.20
    of most competitive industries (14.366) (23.394) (0.727) (1.051) (10.809) (17.099) (0.558) (0.788)
Democracy (G) vs. Dictatorship (G) Democracy (E) vs. Dictatorship (E)
SUE FE (%) SUE FE (%)
FE scaled by price FE scaled by assets FE scaled by price FE scaled by assets
Democracy (G) vs. Dictatorship (G) Democracy (E) vs. Dictatorship (E)
 
 